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Abstract
The United States and the European Union are both firmly committed
to eliminating gender discrimination. However, as I show in this Article,
they have adopted fundamentally different strategies in pursuing this
objective: Whereas the United States offers plaintiffs much more generous
procedural rules and far more powerful remedies, the European Union
relies on more comprehensive substantive prohibitions against discrimina-
tion. What lies behind these different approaches?
Contrary to existing scholarship, which emphasizes path dependence
arguments, I argue that differences between gender discrimination laws in
the United States and Europe can best be understood as the result of a
fundamental ideological divide. U.S. law is designed to grant protection
against discrimination across social boundaries. By contrast, much of
Europe espouses a "social-democratic" conception of gender discrimina-
tion law that views the protection of working-class employees as its pri-
mary concern.
Several European countries have recently adopted or are considering
the adoption of mandatory gender quotas for corporate boards. However,
as I demonstrate in this article, such quotas merely address the symptoms
of a much more foundational issue. European gender discrimination law
is designed to protect working-class women, not women with managerial
aspirations. Quotas cannot redress this imbalance; they can merely hide
its symptoms. Accordingly, European reformers who aspire to a more
class-neutral gender discrimination law will have to consider much more
profound structural changes.
Introduction
A female part-time employee finds out that her employer pays part-
time employees substantially less than full-time employees for the same
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work- She also learns that the part-time employees are mostly female,
whereas the full-time employees are mostly male. Does she have a viable
claim of gender discrimination against her employer? The answer is "yes"
if she works in the European Union, but "no" if she works in the United
States.'
A woman applies for a managerial position. Despite the fact that she is
qualified for the position, the employer rejects her application and contin-
ues to solicit applicants. Several weeks later, the employer hires a man. Do
these facts suffice to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination?
They do in the United States, but not in the European Union.2
These examples are pieces of a larger puzzle: Both the United States
and Europe are deeply committed to the goal of eradicating gender discrim-
ination in employment, yet, as this article reveals, they have adopted very
different strategies to combat discrimination. The European Union boasts
stricter substantive prohibitions against discrimination. The United States,
by contrast, offers plaintiffs favorable procedural rules and more powerful
remedies.3 What accounts for these different approaches?
The existing literature, inasmuch as it seeks to explain differences
between gender discrimination laws in the United States and Europe,
focuses on path dependence.4 According to this theory, present diver-
gences are the result of each legal system's inherent tendency to develop
along its initial path: minor choices by lawmakers and courts early on have
led to considerable differences today.5
The path dependence argument is no doubt true to an extent. That
legal regimes are generally path dependent is well established,6 and there is
no reason to believe that gender discrimination law is the exception to this
phenomenon. Indeed, in common law countries like the United States, the
principle of stare decisis virtually guarantees a certain amount of path
dependence,7 and even civil law courts, which do not recognize stare deci-
1. See infra Part I.A.2.
2. See infra Part I.B.4.a.
3. See generally infra Part 1.
4. See, e.g., Katerina Linos, Path Dependence in Discrimination Law: Employment
Cases in the United States and the European Union, 35 YALEJ. INT'L L. 115, 115-69 (2010)
(presenting a path dependence theory to explain various differences between EU and
U.S. gender discrimination law); Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimina-
tion and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1315, 1315-71 (2008) (invoking
path dependence to explain French procedural rules in antidiscrimination cases).
5. See Linos, supra note 4, at 117 (stressing that, because of path dependence, early
choices by courts and lawmakers can have "momentous consequences much later in
time").
6. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1999) (describing path
dependence in corporate law); Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence:
Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEx. L. REv. 1657 (2002) (identifying path
dependence in securities regulation); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law:
The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601
(2001) (exploring path dependence in the law in general).
7. See Hathaway, supra note 6, at 606 ("The doctrine of stare decisis thus creates an
explicitly path-dependent process.").
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sis, attach considerable importance to existing case law.8
This does not mean, however, that path dependence is the primary
cause, or even a central cause, of the differences in the gender discrimina-
tion laws of the United States and Europe. To the contrary, there are strong
reasons to believe that gender discrimination law is less prone to path
dependence than most other areas of the law. Within only a few decades,
the United States and Europe went from having no federal gender discrimi-
nation legislation to full-fledged protections against gender discrimination
in the workplace.9 This kind of tectonic shift in the law is unlikely to occur
without fundamental changes at the political and social level; and, indeed,
it is difficult to think of a more powerful political and social dynamic in the
second half of the twentieth century than the civil rights movement.10
Where such mighty cultural forces are at play, the prior shape of the law
can be but one of several factors determining the trajectory of the law's
development.
In this Article, I argue that the disparities between U.S. and European
rules on gender discrimination can best be understood as expressions of a
fundamental ideological divide. In the United States, a broad political coa-
lition that extended well beyond lawmakers closely allied with the labor
movement or other working-class organizations drove the enactment of
Title VII, the centerpiece of U.S. employment discrimination law." It is
not surprising, therefore, that the resulting protections against discrimina-
tion also cut across social boundaries.
By contrast, many continental European countries adhere to a "social-
democratic" conception of gender discrimination law, which has the pro-
tection of working-class employees as its primary goal. "Working class" is
used broadly here to encompass not only blue-collar workers, but also
other rank-and-file employees without professional status or managerial
prospects. The legal focus on these workers is manifested at both the EU
(federal) and member-state levels, the latter of which is represented in this
article by France and Germany.12
As I show in this Article, Europe offers stronger substantive provisions
against discrimination than the United States, but combines them with
weaker rules on remedies and procedure. I argue that the ideological divide
8. See Christiane C. Wendehorst, The State as a Foundation of Private Law Reason-
ing, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 567, 573 n.21 (2008) (noting that, under the prevailing view in
civil law jurisdictions, "precedents give rise to a presumption of rightness" and shift the
burden of persuasion).
9. See generally infra Part Ill.
10. Aldon Morris fittingly calls the civil rights movement "one of the pivotal develop-
ments of the twentieth century." Aldon Morris, A Retrospective on the Civil Rights Move-
ment: Political and Intellectual Landmarks, 25 ANN. REv. Soc. 517, 517 (1999).
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. Relevant features of French and German laws tend to be widely shared by the
rest of continental Western Europe, which makes my reasoning more broadly applicable.
One caveat, however: the United Kingdom and Ireland, being common-law countries,
have a somewhat different tradition in matters of gender discrimination law and shall
remain exempt from my analysis.
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between gender discrimination laws in the United States and Europe can
explain this divergence.
To the extent that the substantive prohibitions against discrimination
are stronger in Europe, these differences typically benefit those workers at
the bottom of the corporate hierarchy. For example, EU law offers greater
protection than U.S. law to employees of small firms and part-time employ-
ees. 13 This is consistent with the social-democratic ideals underlying Euro-
pean gender discrimination law since part-time employees and employees
of small firms are also disproportionately likely to be low-wage workers.
Different ideologies can also account for the weakness of the European
rules on remedies and procedure in gender discrimination cases. Gender
discrimination litigation is not the only way to protect workers against dis-
crimination. Rather, general rules and institutions of labor and employ-
ment law can serve the same function. Collective bargaining agreements,
for example, help to enforce the prohibition against wage discrimination.1 4
Crucially, though, the general rules of gender and employment law do not
protect all employees alike. Instead, they are much more effective at pro-
tecting working-class employees than at protecting managerial employees.
For example, the wages of managerial employees typically are not governed
by collective bargaining agreements.' 5 As a result, the European failure to
offer strong rules on remedies and procedure in discrimination cases
impacts managerial employees and working-class employees in very differ-
ent ways. For managerial employees, the lack of strong procedural rules
and remedies drastically limits the value of the substantive prohibitions
against discrimination. For working-class employees, weak procedural
rules and remedies are much less problematic, since such employees can
rely on alternative enforcement mechanisms.
Will the ideological divide between gender discrimination laws in the
United States and Europe persist in the future, or will Europe embrace a
more class-neutral vision of gender discrimination law? On the surface,
the latter scenario may seem evidenced by Europe's recent move toward
mandatory gender quotas for corporate boards. The first such quota was
introduced in 2003 by Norway.16 France adopted its version in January
2011,17 and Belgium followed in June 2011.18 The German government
has publicly threatened to introduce quotas unless firms diversify their
13. See infra Part I.A.1-2.
14. See infra Part IV.B.1.
15. Id.
16. See Lizette Alvarez, Norway Is Set to Compel Boardrooms to Let More Women in,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at A3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/14/?
world/norway-is-set-to-compel-boardrooms-to-let-more-women-in.html.
17. See Emile Picey & Daniel Flynn, France Sets Quota for Women on Big Companies'
Boards, RETTERS (an. 13, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/?13/us-
france-equality-idUSTRE70C5ZA20110113.
18. See Frauenquote fir barsennotierte Unternehmen [Women's Quota for Listed Com-
panies], HANDELSBLATr, June 30, 2011 (Ger.), available at http://www.handelsblatt.?com/
politik/international/frauenquote-fuer-boersennotierte-unternehmen/4345192.html
[hereinafter HANDELSBLATT article].
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boards voluntarily within the next five years,' 9 and the European Commis-
sion, for its part, is considering EU legislation to impose such quotas
union-wide. 20 Europe on the whole appears determined to add gender
diversity to European boardrooms, which trail far behind their American
counterparts in this regard. 2'
As I will show in this Article, however, gender quotas address only one
symptom of a much deeper structural problem. European gender discrimi-
nation law is primarily designed to protect working-class women, not
women with managerial aspirations. Quotas for corporate boards-espe-
cially as they are currently designed in Europe-cannot remedy this imbal-
ance, but can only hide its most visible symptom. Accordingly, those
European countries interested in a more class-neutral approach to gender
discrimination law will have to consider more profound changes to the
structure of their laws.
The structure of this Article is as follows: Part I surveys major differ-
ences between gender discrimination laws in the United States and Europe.
Part II discusses possible explanations for these differences. Part III exam-
ines the history of gender discrimination law in the United States and
Europe and shows that European gender discrimination law has, from its
very beginning, focused primarily on the protection of working-class
women. Part IV argues that today's differences between gender discrimina-
tion laws in the United States and Europe are best explained by a continu-
ing ideological divide. Part V discusses the European trend towards gender
quotas for corporate boards.
1. U.S. v. European Gender Discrimination Law
In this part, I will analyze the most important differences between gen-
der discrimination laws in the United States and Europe.
As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that some common ground
exists in the gender discrimination laws of the United States and Europe.
Like the United States, the European Union prohibits not only wage dis-
crimination, 22 but also discrimination in other aspects of employment,
such as hiring,23 promotion,2 4 termination,25 and working conditions.2 6
19. Von der Leyen Droht Konzernen mit der Frauenquote [Von der Leyen Threatens
Corporations with Women's Quota], FIN. TIMES DEUTSCHLAND, Jan.19, 2011, at 1 (Ger.)
[hereinafter FIN. TIMES DEUTSCHLAND article].
20. See Nicola Clark, Where Final Step is Hardest to Reach: Despite Advance, Women
Find Wider Gender Gap at Top of Ladder in Europe, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 27, 2011, at
204.
21. See infra Part V.A.
22. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 157, para. 1, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47; Directive 2006/54/EC, Of
the European Parliament and of the Council of July 5, 2006 on the Implementation of
the Principle of Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment of Men and Women in Mat-
ters of Employment and Occupation art. 4, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 23 [hereinafter Directive
2006/54/EC].
23. See Directive 2006/54/EC, supra note 22 art. 14(a).
24. Id.
25. Id. art. 14(c).
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Furthermore, U.S. law's dual-pronged approach to discrimination-dispa-
rate treatment and disparate impact 27-has an immediate analog in EU
law, which proscribes both "direct discrimination" and "indirect discrimi-
nation" respectively. 28
Substantial differences emerge, however, beyond these fundamentals.
As this Part will show, substantive prohibitions against discrimination are
more comprehensive in the European Union, but procedural rules and rem-
edies are generally more plaintiff-friendly in the United States. Crucially,
these differences are not merely of a doctrinal nature. Rather, they amount
to real disparities in the level of protection against gender discrimination
offered by each system.
A. The Substantive Prohibitions against Discrimination
In the context of substantive law, three differences stand out: EU law
offers greater protection than U.S. law to employees of small firms, part-
time employees, and employees subject to disparate impact discrimination.
1. Employees at Small Firms
Whereas the European Union applies all of its gender discrimination
law to all employers, 29 U.S. law is, for lack of a better word, more discrimi-
nating. Although the Equal Pay Act prohibits wage discrimination by all
employers regardless of size,30 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act applies only
to employers of "fifteen or more employees." 3' U.S. federal law, therefore,
does not protect employees of small enterprises against gender discrimina-
tion except in the area of wages.32
To be sure, employees outside the scope of Title VII may still invoke
state gender discrimination laws. However, many of the states that have
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, _ , 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009)
("Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination (known as 'disparate treatment') as
well as, in some cases, practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a
disproportionately adverse effect on minorities (known as 'disparate impact').").
28. Directive 2006/54/EC, supra note 22 arts. 4, 14.
29. See, e.g., HANDELSBLATr article, supra note 18.
30. Interestingly, when the Act was adopted, a minimum threshold of 25 or more
employees was suggested. See S. REP. No. 88-176, at 2 (1963) ("Other legislation intro-
duced in this Congress would have required any employer in commerce with 25 or more
employees at a single place of employment to comply with proposed equal pay legisla-
tion . . . ."). However, because the Equal Pay Act was eventually adopted as an amend-
ment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress decided not to define the scope of
application of the equal pay provision differently from those of the rest of the Act. See
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK: FEDERAL EQUAL PAY LAW OF
1963, at 102 (1963) ("The committee believes that the uniformity of application offered
by S. 1409 obviates the problems which would be created by any expansion or curtail-
ment of labor standards coverage.").
31. Civil Rights Act tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
32. Cf. Richard Carlson, The Small Firm Exemption and the Single Employer Doctrine
in Employment Discrimination Law, 80 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1197, 1197 (2006) (noting that
a firm with no more than fourteen employees can refuse to hire women without violating
federal antidiscrimination law).
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adopted prohibitions against gender discrimination in the workplace have
followed the model of Title VII and excluded small firms.33 The resulting
gap is substantial, since small businesses account for a sizable portion of
overall employment. The latest available Census data put the number
between 11% and 18%.34
2. Part-time Workers
Gender discrimination laws in the United States and Europe also dif-
fer in their treatment of part-time employees. In practice, such employees
are often female: Women make up 64% of part-time workers in the United
States35 and 76% in the European Union.36 The obvious risk, therefore, is
that employers discriminate against women by offering part-time employ-
ees less favorable terms than full-time employees.
This issue is of considerable practical importance since part-time
employees constitute a substantial part of the workforce. They account for
roughly 20% of all U.S. employment37 and for about 18% of employment
33. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461 (2011) (placing the threshold for an
employer's size at fifteen or more employees); FLA. STAT. § 760.02 (2011) (defining an
employer as a person employing fifteen or more employees); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-
101B(1)(A) (2011) (defining an employer as a person employing fifteen or more employ-
ees); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.030 (2011) (defining an employer as a person employing
eight or more employees); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102 (2010) (defining an employer as a
person employing fifteen or more employees); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 613.310 (2010)
(defining an employer as a person employing fifteen or more employees); OKLA. STAT. tit.
25, § 1301(1) (2011) (defining an employer as a person employing fifteen or more
employees); MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 20-601 (2011) (defining an employer as a
person employing fifteen or more employees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-30 (2010) (defin-
ing an employer as a person employing fifteen or more employees); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 21.002 (2011) (defining an employer as a person employing fifteen or more employ-
ees); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-102 (2011) (defining an employer as a person employing
fifteen or more employees); CAL. GOVT CODE § 12926 (2011) (defining an employer as a
person employing five or more employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 710 (2011) (defin-
ing an employer as a person employing four or more employees); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
1002 (2010) (defining an employer as a person employing four or more employees); N.Y.
EXEc. § 292 (2010) (defining an employer as a person employing four or more
employees).
34. The total number of paid employees in the United States in 2008 was
120,903,551. Of these employees, 6,086,291 worked for firms with less than five
employees, 6,878,051 for firms with five to nine employees, and 8,497,391 for firms
with 10 to 19 employees. See Statistics About Business Size (Including Small Business)
from the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. CENsus BuREAu, tbl. 2a, http://www.census.gov/?epcd/
www/smallbus.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
35. See U.S. BuREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK
69-70 (2010) (indicating that there were 27,244 part-time workers in the United States
in 2009 of which 17,525 were women), available at http://www.bls.gov/?cps/wlf-table
20-2010.pdf [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE].
36. Out of 41,219 part-time workers in the European Union in 2009, 31,273 were
women. See Full-time and Part-time Employment by Sex and Economic Activity,
DATAMARKET, http://datamarket.com/data/set/l9uv/full-time-and-part-time-employ-
ment?-by-sex-and-economic-activity-from-2008-nace-rev2-1000-3#!display=line (for num-
ber of part-time workers, select "Total" under SEX; "PT" under WORKTIME; then select
"Visualize"; for number of female part-time workers, change the SEX value to "F" and
keep all other values the same) (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
37. See WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, supra note 35, at 69-72.
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in the European Union.38 Even more importantly, part-time work accounts
for 26.5% of female employment in the United States39 and 31% in the
European Union.40
Against this background, it is noteworthy that U.S. and EU gender
discrimination laws diverge greatly in their treatment of part-time workers.
To be sure, neither U.S. law nor EU law excludes part-time workers from its
scope of application. However, part-time workers face an important obsta-
cle in the United States that is absent in Europe: U.S. courts have been
adamant that part-time employees are not comparable to full-time employ-
ees.41 Accordingly, a female employee cannot establish discrimination by
pointing out that she is treated worse than a male full-time employee whose
situation is otherwise comparable.
By contrast, European law has proven substantially more protective of
part-time workers. The Court of Justice was quick to acknowledge the pos-
sibility that discrimination against part-time workers had a disparate
impact on women.42 More recently, the European Union's statutory law
has taken a step further to provide explicitly that any discrimination on
the basis of an employee's part-time status constitutes gender
discrimination.43
3. Disparate Impact and Wage Discrimination
The doctrine of "indirect discrimination" also has a broader scope of
application in the European Union than the parallel "disparate impact"
doctrine does in the United States. Both doctrines outlaw a practice that is
neutral on its face but in fact burdens one group more heavily than another
without justification.4 4 However, some U.S. courts have resisted the use of
the disparate impact doctrine in wage discrimination cases,45 whereas EU
38. See EUROSTAT, EUROPE IN FIGURES: EUROSTAT YEARBOOK 2010, at 291 tbl.5.5
(2010), available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_- OFFPUB/KS-CD-10-
220/EN/KS-CD-10-220-EN.PDF (putting the percentage of part-time employees in 2008
at 18.2%) [hereinafter EUROSTAT YEARBOOK 2010].
39. See WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, supra note 35, at 70.
40. EUROSTAT YEARBOOK 2010, supra note 38, at 283.
41. See, e.g., llhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1155 (7th Cir. 1997); Flebotte
v. Dow Jones & Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19875, at *13 (D. Mass. Dec. 6, 2000).
42. See Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R.
1620, para. 31.
43. See Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 Dec. 1997 Concerning the Framework
Agreement on Part-time Work Concluded by UNICE, CEEP, and the ETUC, annex cl.
4(1), 1998 OJ. (L 14) 9 [hereinafter Directive 97/81/EC]; see also Part-Time Work,
EUROFOUND (May 5, 2011), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/?industrialrela-
tions/dictionary/definitions/PARTTIMEWORK.htm.
44. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(defining disparate impact discrimination under Title VII to include "employment prac-
tices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall
more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity").
45. See, e.g., AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985); see also
Sacha E. de Lange, Toward Gender Equality: Affirmative Action, Comparable Worth, and
the Women's Movement, 31 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 315, 349 n.285 (2007) ("The
lower courts that have decided this issue have generally rejected the use of a disparate
impact standard in sex-based wage discrimination cases."). But see Atonio v. Wards
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law imposes no such restriction on the use of the indirect discrimination
doctrine.46 This difference is highly significant in practice since many of
the cases where EU plaintiffs successfully raise claims of indirect discrimi-
nation involve wage discrimination. 47
B. Procedural Rules, Remedies, and the Burden of Proof
As has become clear from the analysis above, substantive prohibitions
against gender discrimination are substantially more comprehensive in the
European Union than in the United States. However, when it comes to
enforcement, the situation is reversed. U.S. law offers plaintiffs three cru-
cial advantages that European plaintiffs must do without: pretrial discov-
ery, U.S.-style punitive damages, and class action lawsuits. In addition, the
rules governing the burden of proof are also much more plaintiff-friendly
in the United States than in Europe.
1. The Ability to Gather Evidence
U.S.-style discovery is unavailable in Germany,48 France,49 and most
other European countries.50 To prevail, the plaintiff in Europe must meet
her burden of proof even though she does not have access to evidence that
is under her employer's control.5 '
2. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages represent another advantage that U.S. plaintiffs
enjoy over their European counterparts. In the United States, Title VII
allows courts to award punitive damages in cases involving intentional dis-
Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1486 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that "disparate impact
analysis can be applied to subjective employment practices," including wage discrimina-
tion, and expressly overruling any prior decisions that have held the contrary).
46. See Directive 2006/54/EC, supra note 22 art. 4 (prohibiting indirect discrimina-
tion with respect to remuneration explicitly).
47. See, e.g., Case 170/84, Bilka-Kauffhaus GmbH v. Karin Weber von Hartz, 1986
E.C.R. 1620, para. 31; Case C-300/06, Ursula Vog v. Land Berlin, 2007 E.C.R. 1-10573,
para. 44; Case C-256/01, Debra Allonby v. Accrington & Rossendale College, 2004
E.C.R. 1-873, para. 75; Case C-184/89, Helga Nimz v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg,
1991 E.C.R. 1-297, para. 15.
48. Joachim Zekoll &Jan Bolt, Die Pflicht zur Vorlage von Urkunden im Zivilprozess-
Amerikanische Verhaltnisse in Deutschland? [The Duty to Present Documents in Civil Pro-
ceedings-American Conditions in Germany?], 55 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
[NJW] 3129, 3129 (2002).
49. See Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of
Proof, 50 AM. J. Comp. L. 243, 248 (2002); Steven J. Stein & Daniel R. Wotman, Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A Comparison of the Major Arbitral Systems
and Rules, 38 Bus. LAW. 1685, 1707 (1983).
50. See Cyrus Afshar & Paul Rose, Capital Markets Competitiveness: A Survey of
Recent Reports, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. LJ. 439, 468 (2007); Nathan D. O'Malley &
Shawn C. Conway, Document Discovery in International Arbitration- Getting the Docu-
ments You Need, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 371, 371 (2005).
51. See Suk, supra note 4, at 1335-37 (describing in detail the difficulties that
French plaintiffs face in bringing a discrimination suit in the absence of any mechanism
akin to pretrial discovery in the United States).
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parate treatment discrimination.5 2 By contrast, EU law does not specify
sanctions against discrimination, but merely requires that the compensa-
tion for victims be "dissuasive and proportionate to the damage suf-
fered."5 3 Member states are free to fill in the details. This is bad for the
plaintiff, because European countries, including the U.K., 54 do not allow
U.S.-style punitive damages in employment discrimination cases.55
The lack of U.S.-style punitive damages does not mean that damages
in Europe are limited to economic loss suffered by the plaintiff. German
law, for example, explicitly allows compensation for noneconomic losses
in cases of gender discrimination. 5 6 However, the amounts awarded are
typically much lower than in the United States. German law limits
noneconomic compensation to three times the employee's monthly sal-
ary,5 7 whereas Title VII caps punitive damages in discrimination cases at
$300,000 for a large firm.5 8 The employee's annual salary would therefore
have to reach $1.2 million in order for Title VII to be as restrictive as Ger-
man law. Even then, Title VII's caps do not prevent plaintiffs from seeking
higher punitive damages based on state anti-discrimination statutes, which
often impose no such limits.59
Less onerous civil damages in Europe are not counterbalanced by
meaningful criminal sanctions. Under German law, gender discrimination
in employment does not constitute a criminal offense. 60 French law allows
for criminal sanctions, 6 1 but they can be imposed only when the discrimi-
nation is intentional6 2 and only if the court is certain' of the defendant's
guilt.6 3 Due to the high threshold for conviction, the sanction is essentially
dead letter in France in the context of employment gender discrimination.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)(2000).
53. Directive 2006/54/EC, supra note 22 art. 18.
54. See Aaron Baker, Access vs Process in Employment Discrimination: Why ADR Suits
the US but not the UK, 31 INDUS. LJ. 113, 115 (2002).
55. See MICHALLE E. MOR BARAK, MANAGING DIVERSITY: TOWARD A GLOBALLY INCLUSIVE
WORKPLACE 51 n.11 (2005); Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European
Approach, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 321, 330 (2001); Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on
Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American Cooperation with Those Systems, 45 KAN. L.
REv. 9, 18 (1996).
56. See Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz [AGGI [Equal Treatment Act], Aug.
14, 2006, BGBI I at 1897, § 15(2) (Ger.).
57. Id.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000) (imposing different caps for punitive damages
depending on the number of employees that the firm has and setting the limit for firms
with more than 500 employees at $300,000).
59. Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
469, 517 n.271 (1993).
60. Cf. AGG § 15 (imposing civil liability, but no criminal sanctions, in cases of
gender discrimination).
61. CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] art. 225-2 (Fr.) (providing for a prison term of up to three
years and a fine of up to 45,000 euros for discrimination).
62. Id. art. 121-3.
63. See William K. Lietzau, Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof: Structural
Pillars for the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 477, 485 n.37 (1999)
(stating that French law requires "that the trier of fact have an inner certainty (intimate
conviction) of the defendant's guilt.").
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According to available data, the number of convictions nationwide between
1997 and 2003 is no higher than two, and possibly as low as zero.64
The lack of punitive damages and other meaningful sanctions com-
promises the effectiveness of European gender discrimination law. For the
employer, the probability of being sued for discrimination is small to begin
with. 65 When the employment relationship is likely to continue, the spec-
ter of the employer's retaliation often discourages lawsuits.66 Even in the
absence of an ongoing employment relationship, it is well documented that
victims of discrimination are generally reluctant to enforce their rights.67
Hence, without punitive damages or other meaningful sanctions, firms
have only limited incentives to prevent gender discrimination.
3. Class Action
U.S.-style class action lawsuits can bypass problems caused by the vic-
tims' reluctance to sue. However, class action lawsuits are not allowed in
discrimination cases in France,68 Germany69 or many countries in
Europe. 70 Without class action, the worst-case scenario from the
64. Between 1997 and 2003, application of section 225-2 of the French Penal Code
led to 137 convictions. Of these convictions, 132 were for discrimination based on crite-
ria other than gender. Three convictions were for gender discrimination, but not in the
employment context. See JEAN-RENE LECERF, SENAT RAPPORT No. 65, at 18 (2004). It
follows that the number of convictions for employment gender discrimination cannot
have been greater than two.
65. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 1031 (1991); see also COMMIsSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF DIRECTIVE 2002/73/EC OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF 23 SEPTEMBER 2002 AMENDING COUNCIL
DIRECTIVE 76/207/EEC ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL TREATMENT
FOR MEN AND WOMEN 7 (2009).
66. See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 65, at 1031-32. Cf. Cheryl R. Kaiser &
Carol T. Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimina-
tion, 27 PERSP. & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 254-55 (2001) (surveying the literature on
the reluctance of discrimination victims to complain about discrimination and sug-
gesting that fear of retaliation may be one reason for this reluctance).
67. See KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY 26 (1992); Robert L. Nelson et.
al., Divergent Paths: Conflicting Conceptions of Employment Discrimination in Law and the
Social Sciences, 4 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sa. 103, 109 (2008); see also Theodore Eisenberg &
Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1991) ("There is already evidence that discrimination vic-
tims are less likely than other victims to bring their grievances to anyone's attention or to
bring them to court."); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 72, 87 (1983) (presenting data indicating that only a small percentage of dis-
crimination victims sue).
68. See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and
Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM. J. CoMP. L. 363, 398 (2008).
69. See, e.g., Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models of Modern Corporations: A Comparative
Analysis of German and U.S. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 555, 598
(2000); Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L. L. 369, 372 (2001).
70. See Louis Degos & Geoffrey V. Morson, Class Systems: The Reforms of Class
Action Laws in Europe Are as Varied as the Nations Themselves, 29 L.A. LAw. 32, 34-36
(2006) (providing an account of the various approaches taken by different European
legal systems to deal with permissive joinder and create a quasi-class action).
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employer's perspective is to be ordered to compensate all of the individual
plaintiffs. And since victims of gender discrimination are generally reluc-
tant to sue,71 the resulting deterrent effect is necessarily limited.
Moreover, even if the victims do sue individually, separate lawsuits are
unlikely to threaten the employer's reputation to the same extent as a class
action would. Class action discrimination suits can wreak havoc on the
employer's reputation, in part because they tend to uncover widespread
patterns of discrimination, which individual discrimination suits with
more limited findings of fact, do not.7 2 Although it is difficult to measure
the deterrence effect of class actions,73 which comprise a relatively small
percentage of employment discrimination suits in the United States,74 even
those scholars who warn against overestimating the effect concede that
employers take the risk of such suits very seriously.75
Of course, a class action lawsuit can be brought only where the class is
sufficiently large.76 Consequently, the proceeding is much more relevant
to rank-and-file employees than to top executives. However, managerial
employees below the board level have made use of class action lawsuits,77
and the more generously one defines the notion of managerial employees,
the more prevalent such lawsuits become.78
4. The Burden of Proof in Disparate Treatment Cases
The rules governing the burden of proof are also much more favorable
to plaintiffs in the United States than in Europe. In disparate impact cases,
U.S. law and EU law allocate the burden of proof in a similar fashion.
71. See supra notes 66-67.
72. See Winnie Chau, Note, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue and a Silver Sixpence for Her Shoe: Dukes v. Wal-Mart & Sex Discrimina-
tion Class Actions, 12 CARDozo J.L. & GENDER 969, 993-96 (2006) (describing the risks
to employer reputation from class actions in gender discrimination cases).
73. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA's Impact on Litigation as a Public Good, 29 CAR-
oozo L. REV. 2517, 2550 (2008).
74. Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (2003).
75. Id. at 1250.
76. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
77. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Three Women Claim Bias at Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 2010, at Bl (describing the attempt to gain class action status in a suit alleging that
there were too few women among Goldman Sachs' managers); Stephen Barr, FBI Settles
Sex-Bias Suit Involving Non-Agents and Management Posts, WASH. PosT, Aug. 16, 2006, at
D04 (describing a class action settlement in a case on behalf of FBI employees, GS-12
and above, who had unsuccessfully sought GS-14 and GS-15 administrative and manage-
rial positions); Patrick McGeehan, Wall Street Highflier to Outcast: A Woman's Story, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at 1 (reporting on plans by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to initiate a class action against Morgan Stanley on the grounds that very
few women have advanced into the investment bank's senior management ranks).
78. Cf. Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Costco Bias Suit Is Given Class-Action
Status, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at C9 (reporting that a federal judge's decision to grant
class action status to plaintiffs claiming that Costco Wholesale had systematically dis-
criminated against women seeking jobs as managers); Marcia Heroux, Ensuring Work-
place Equity, SUN SENTINEL, May 17, 2007, at D1 (describing a class action settlement as
part of which the grocery chain Publix agreed to change promotion practices such as to
ensure a fair representation of women in management ranks).
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Under both legal systems, the plaintiff has to show the disparate impact of
a measure, and if she succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts to the defen-
dant to demonstrate that the measure is justified.79
But substantial differences arise in the context of disparate treatment
discrimination. In both the United Statesso and Europe,8t the discrimina-
tion victim's initial evidentiary burden in disparate treatment or direct dis-
crimination cases is limited to a prima facie showing of gender
discrimination. However, both the difficulty and the consequence of that
prima facie showing differ substantially between the two jurisdictions.
a. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Gender Discrimination
Establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is far more diffi-
cult in Europe than it is in the United States. The U.S. approach was set
forth in the race discrimination case McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.82
There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified
for ajob for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons
of complainant's qualifications.8 3
Over the years, these requirements, which also apply, mutatis mutandis, in
gender discrimination cases,8 4 have become more flexible as courts have
adjusted them to fit different fact patterns.8 5 For example, the McDonnell
Douglas test also applies if, instead of leaving the position open, the
employer hires a candidate employee outside the protected group. 86
79. Regarding U.S. law, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2011), which states
that disparate impact discrimination is established if the plaintiff demonstrates "that a
respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of ... sex" and if "the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity."
Regarding EU law, see Directive 2006/54/EC, supra note 22 art. 19(1), providing that if
the plaintiff establishes "facts from which it may be presumed that there has been ...
indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no
breach of the principle of equal treatment."
80. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing a
prima facie test with respect to Title VII).
81. See Directive 2006/54/EC, supra note 22 art. 19(1).
82. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
83. Id.
84. E.g., Tex Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981); Louis
v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 303 F. Supp. 2d 799, 801-02 (M.D. La. 2003).
85. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Ordi-
narily, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing
that (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is competent to perform the job or is
performing his duties satisfactorily; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision or
action; and (4) the decision or action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination based on his membership in the protected class.").
86. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6.
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Importantly, the McDonnell Douglas test is relatively generous to the
plaintiff in that all the facts that she has to prove are typically within her
reach. Obviously, the plaintiff can readily establish her own gender and
qualifications, and she will frequently be able to show that the employer
hired another applicant or continued to advertise the position after
rejecting her. Accordingly, as one court aptly put it, "the initial elements of
the prima facie case are relatively simple to prove."87
European law, by contrast, makes it much more difficult to establish a
prima facie case of disparate treatment. Under EU law, the plaintiff has to
"establish . . . facts from which it may be presumed that there has been
direct or indirect discrimination."8 8 In disparate treatment cases, this stan-
dard is generally understood to require the plaintiff to persuade the court
that she has more likely than not suffered discrimination on the basis of her
gender.89 In other words, unlike U.S. law, EU law makes it incumbent
upon the plaintiff to show that (a) she was subjected to disparate treatment
and (b) her gender was, more likely than not, the reason for the disparate
treatment.90
These requirements are very hard to meet without inside information.
For example, consider the plight of a job applicant who suspects that she
was not hired because she is a woman. That job applicant may know that
she meets the qualifications for the job, and she may also know that she
was rejected and that the employer continued interviewing other candi-
dates. But EU law does not compel the courts to infer from these facts that
discrimination occurred. 91 After all, there are many other possible expla-
nations for the rejection, 92 such as a bad impression from the interview or
87. Randle v. LaSalle Telecomm. Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Rob-
ert J. Smith, Note, The Title VII Pretext Question: Resolved in Light of St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 70 IND. L.J. 281, 283 (1994)).
88. Directive 2006/54/EC, supra note 22 art. 19(1). The Member States may-but
are not required to-provide for rules that are more favorable to the plaintiff. Id. art.
19(2).
89. See Christoph Bergwitz, Die Neuen EG-Richtlinien zur Beweislast bei Geschlecht-
sbedingter Diskriminierung [The New EC Directives on the Burden of Proof in Cases of
Gender Discrimination], 52 DER BETRIEB 94, 97 (1999) (Ger.); Alexander Leuchten, Der
Einfluss der EG-Richtlinien zur Gleichbehand lung auf das deutsche Arbeitsrecht [The Influ-
ence of the EC Equal Treatment Directives on German Employment Law], 19 NEUE ZEIT-
SCHRIFT FOR ARBEITSRECHT [NZA] 738, 740 (2002) (Ger.). The same interpretation has
been adopted with respect to the German statute implementing the relevant European
directives. E.g., Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Feb. 5, 2004, 8 AZR
112/03, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW], 2112 (2115), 2004 (Ger.); JoBsT-
HUBERTUS BAUER, BURKHARD GOPFERT & STEFFEN KRIEGER, ALLGEMEINES GLEICHBEHAN-
DLUNGSGESETZ [EQUAL TREATMENT ACT] 10 (2007) (Ger.).
90. See Bergwitz, supra note 89, at 97.
91. See, e.g., Gregor Thiising, § 22 AGG, in 2 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BORGER-
LICHEN GESETZBUCH § 22 12 (Kurt Rebmann et al. eds., 5th ed. 1997) (commenting on
section 22 of the General Equal Treatment Act which implements EU law).
92. Id. See Peter Windel, Der Beweis Dishriminierender Benachteiligungen [Proving
Discriminatory Disparate Treatment], 60 RECHT DER ARBEIT [RDA] 1, 6 (2007) (Ger.) (not-
ing that there is "obviously" no assumption that disparate treatment suffered by the
applicant was motivated by the applicant's gender and explaining that such disparate
treatment is therefore not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination).
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doubts about the applicant's qualifications. Thus, unless there are clearly
observable indicia of discrimination, such as gender-specific language in
the job posting93 or discriminatory remarks during the interview, 94 the
plaintiff will usually be unable to establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment discrimination.
In sum, the difference between U.S. law and EU law is substantial.
While U.S. plaintiffs will find it relatively easy to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, EU plaintiffs will find it very difficult to do so
unless they have access to inside information.
b. The Consequences of a Prima Facie Case
Once the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of
gender discrimination, European law turns out to be more favorable to the
plaintiff than U.S. law. In the United States, after the plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie case, the employer is simply required to articulate a
nondiscriminatory reason for his action.95 The burden of proof remains
with the plaintiff to show that the employer's articulated reason is a mere
pretext for discrimination. 96 In the European Union, by contrast, the con-
sequences of a prima facie case of discrimination are much more far-reach-
ing. Once the employee has established a prima facie case of
discrimination, the employer has to prove that it did not discriminate
against the employee. 97
In short, for those plaintiffs who manage to establish a prima facie
case, the situation is more advantageous in the European Union. However,
in practice, this matters little. Because the threshold for establishing a
prima facie case is so high and because European plaintiffs do not have the
benefit of pretrial discovery, relatively few plaintiffs can ever hope to meet
their initial burden of proof.98
93. Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Feb. 2, 2004, 8 AZR 112/03
(Ger.) (holding that a gender-specific job advertisement is sufficient to make a prima
facie case that the job candidate was put at a disadvantage because of her gender).
94. E.g., Thusing, supra note 91, at § 22 11 (noting that statements by the
employer or his agents, to the extent that they act within the scope of their authority, can
be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination); Windel, supra note 92, at
6 (arguing that discriminatory statements may establish a prima facie case of
discrimination).
95. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973) (explaining
that once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, "[t]he burden
then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employee's rejection").
96. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Moreover, for a
mandatory ruling of discrimination, it is not enough to show that the employer lied
when it articulated the pretext. Rather, the employee cannot show that the articulated
reason is a pretext "unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimi-
nation was the real reason." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993). If
the employer has articulated a reason for his action and the plaintiff has offered no
evidence beyond the bare minimum that is necessary to establish a prima facie case,
even summary judgment against the plaintiff may be appropriate. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot
Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).
97. See Directive 2006/54/EC, supra note 22 art. 19(1).
98. See Suk, supra note 4, at 1335-37.
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Thus, the rules governing the burden of proof neatly fit into the overall
pattern that characterizes the differences between gender discrimination
laws in the United States and Europe. The substantive provisions are more
generous in the European Union, but when it comes to sanctioning and
enforcing these provisions, U.S. law offers plaintiffs more powerful reme-
dies, a more favorable allocation of the burden of proof, and more plaintiff-
friendly procedural rules.
II. Non-Ideological Explanations
What accounts for the profound differences between gender discrimi-
nation laws in the United States and Europe? In law, nothing is ever mono-
causal, and so we should expect multiple factors to have a bearing on the
matter. In the remainder of this Article, I will show that different ideolo-
gies are not only one of these factors, but in fact play a central role. Indeed,
I will demonstrate that ideology can explain many of the above-described
differences between U.S. law and European law.
Before making the affirmative case for the relevance of ideology in
comparative gender discrimination law, however, it is helpful to consider
potential competing explanations. Two types of arguments are of interest
in this context. The first invokes the concept of path dependence, whereas
the second stresses the role of coherence within a legal system.
The explanation favored by existing scholarship is path dependence.99
Legal systems have an inherent tendency to follow their original path.
Accordingly, the argument runs, seemingly minor doctrinal choices made
in the early days of gender discrimination law explain why differences
between gender discrimination laws in the United States and Europe per-
sist and even deepen. 00 Today's differences in gender discrimination laws
are therefore not motivated by ideological differences existing today, but
are simply a result of past choices by courts and lawmakers. The past
shape of the law dictates its present shape.
It is crucial to note at this point that this theory is much more far-
reaching than it may appear at first glance. Obviously, all present facts-
including today's differences in ideology-can somehow be traced back to
past events, and so it would be trivial to argue that past events are impor-
tant in understanding the present shape of gender discrimination laws in
different countries. But the path dependence argument in comparative
gender discrimination law is much more ambitious. It asserts that past
legal differences explain today's divergences in gender discrimination
laws. 101
99. See, e.g., Linos, supra note 4, at 115-69 (presenting a path dependence theory to
explain various differences between EU and U.S. gender discrimination law); Suk, supra
note 4, at 1315-71 (2008) (invoking path dependence to explain French procedural
rules in antidiscrimination cases).
100. See Linos, supra note 4, at 117 (stressing that, because of path dependence, early
choices by courts and lawmakers can have "momentous consequences much later in
time").
101. See id.
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Apart from the path dependence theory, another possibility is that
gender discrimination laws in the United States and Europe simply reflect
the characteristics of the respective legal systems at large and, importantly,
that these characteristics were chosen without regard to the question of
how much protection to accord to working-class employees. For example,
German law never allows for pretrial discovery, 102 and so it is hardly sur-
prising that there is no pretrial discovery in gender discrimination cases. I
refer to this type of argument as a coherence-based explanation, since it
presupposes a legal system's inherent tendency to make coherent choices
across different areas of the law.
Path-dependence and coherence-based arguments may both have a
legitimate role in explaining differences between gender discrimination
laws in Europe and in the United States. However, as I show in the follow-
ing sections, there are strong reasons not to exaggerate their explanatory
power.
A. Path Dependence Arguments
Path dependence arguments may seem inviting where the law exhibits
a certain level of continuity. However, it is crucial to note that legal con-
tinuity does not imply path dependence. Path dependence arguments pre-
sume that the present shape of the law is a function of its past shape.103
But if a legal system continues to adhere to certain norms, the reasons do
not necessarily lie in the past. Instead, it may simply be the case that the
preferences and policy consideration that guided the choice of a certain
norm still persist. In that case, the law owes its present shape to present
policy considerations, not to path dependence.
Accordingly, we should take care when invoking path dependence
arguments. Even if a legal system shows a certain level of continuity, one
must first determine what reasons prompted the choice of a given norm in
the first place and whether these considerations still apply today. If the
relevant motives can be ascertained and if they still persist today then there
is no reason to suspect that path dependence completely accounts for the
status quo.
In the area of gender discrimination, path dependence arguments face
an additional challenge: More than many other areas of the law, antidis-
crimination law-including gender discrimination law-reflects the values
of a society. 0 4 The spectacular rise of gender discrimination law was the
result of uniquely powerful socio-political dynamics in the form of the civil
102. Zekoll & Bolt, supra note 48, at 3129.
103. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARv. L.
REv. 641, 643 (1996) ("Today's road depends on what path was taken before.").
104. For example, in the European Union, the principle of non-discrimination
between women and men is deemed to be so important that it is mentioned among the
fundamental aims of the European Union. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union art. 3(3), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 0J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter TEU] ("[The
Union] shall . . . promote social justice and protection, equality between women and
men . . . .").
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rights movement and, especially in the decades after the enactment of Title
VII, the women's rights movement.105 However, the greater the influence
of cultural forces on a given area of the law, the more difficult it is to view
present legal rules as determined by past legal rules.
At the EU level, there is an additional reason not to overemphasize the
role of path dependence. Because the European Union is a work in pro-
gress,106 European Union law is inherently more dynamic than most other
legal systems. Since the establishment of the European Economic Commu-
nity in 1957, its constitutional treaty has undergone at least five fundamen-
tal transformations. 0 7 The latest of these transformations occurred as a
result of the Treaty of Lisbon, 108 which only came into force in December
2009.109 Moreover, membership in the European Union is constantly
expanding: from six member states in 1957 to twenty-seven now. Each
new member state has its own legal and cultural traditions, which then
feed into EU law. This feedback effect occurs not only in the legislative
process, but also at the European Court of Justice. One judge from each
member state sits on the Court.110 As the composition of the European
Union changes, so does the composition of the Court of Justice. It is there-
fore unsurprising that legal continuity is not as high on the Court's agenda
as in other jurisdictions. Instead, the Court is expressly committed to a
dynamic interpretation of EU law."'
Combined, these factors undercut path dependence arguments, even
if they do not rule them out altogether.
B. Coherence-based Arguments
Coherence-based arguments may seem to offer a better non-ideological
explanation for differences between discrimination laws in the United
States and Europe. According to this line of thought, these differences are
simply due to the fact that U.S. and European gender discrimination laws
share commonly applicable features with the rest of their respective legal
systems.1 12 Indeed, several of the legal norms that are central to the suc-
105. It is often thought that the civil rights movement was a catalyst for other social
movements including the women's right movement. See Morris, supra note 10, at 527.
106. The Preamble of the Treaty on European Union specifically invokes the dynamic
nature of the European Union by stressing the member states' resolution "to continue
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." TEU pmbl.
107. These included the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty of
Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, and the Lisbon Treaty. See generally PAUL CRAIG &
GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAw: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 7-37 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing
the five relevant treaties).
108. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 OJ. (C 306) 1.
109. See Amnon Lehavi, The Global Law of the Land, 81 U. COLO. L. REv. 425, 441
(2010).
110. TEU art. 19(1).
111. Case 283/81, SrI CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415 para. 20
("[Elvery provision of Community law must be ... interpreted in the light of the ... state
of evolution [of Community law] at the date on which the provision in question is to be
applied.").
112. See, e.g., Zekoll & Bolt, supra note 48, at 3129.
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cess or failure of gender discrimination cases are by no means germane to
gender discrimination law in particular: Pretrial discovery, class action
lawsuits, and punitive damages are broadly available in the United States
and broadly unavailable in Europe.113 With respect to these features,
therefore, the plaintiff in a gender discrimination case is treated like a
plaintiff in any other area of the law. Thus, the observed differences may
seem to be motivated more by coherence than by ideological differences
related to the protection of working-class employees.
However, the importance of coherence-based arguments is much more
limited than it may appear. To begin, legal systems are frequently less
coherent than they seem. German law illustrates this point. Despite their
rejection of U.S.-style punitive damages," 4 German courts have explicitly
recognized that damage awards may primarily serve a deterrent rather
than compensatory function in certain cases,"l 5 and that this deterrent
function can be taken into account in determining the amount to be
awarded." 6 Accordingly, the decision to cap damages for non-economic
loss in gender discrimination cases can hardly be based on the overall
structure of German law. Rather, it would have been entirely consistent
with the principles developed by the German judiciary to take a more gen-
erous approach to such damage awards in the interest of guaranteeing
effective deterrence.
Similarly, although U.S.-style class actions are unavailable in Ger-
many,11 7 German securities law allows so-called "model proceedings,"
which represent a compromise between individual suits and class
actions." 8 A model proceeding does not spare the plaintiffs the trouble of
bringing suits individually, but it does allow the court to concentrate on
one of the suits (the "model"), the resolution of which will also be binding
on the rest." 9 As a result, the plaintiffs avoid the costs in time and money
normally associated with a multitude of individual lawsuits.120 Once
again, this raises an obvious question: If German law can make an excep-
tion for securities lawsuits, why not also for gender discrimination law?
113. See Directive 2006/54/EC, supra note 22 art. 18; see also Degos & Morson, supra
note 70, 34-36 (2006).
114. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 21, 1992, 45 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 3096 (3102), 1992 (Ger.) (holding that punitive
damage awards are incompatible with the German ordre public).
115. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court ofJustice] Dec. 5, 1995, 48 NEUEJURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 984 (985), 1995 (Ger.).
116. Id.
117. MOR BARAK, supra note 55, at 51 n.11; Schlosser, supra note 55, at 18.
118. GESETZ ZUR EINFOHRUNG VON KAPITALANLEGER-MUSTERVERFAHREN [KAPMUG] [CAPI-
TAL MARKETS MODEL CASE ACT], Aug. 16, 2005, BGBL I, 2005, 2437 (Ger.).
119. Id. arts. 7, 16.
120. Christoph Keller & Annabella Kolling, Das Gesetz zur Einfahrung von
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahren-Ein lberblick [ The Act Introducing Model Proceedings for
Securities Investors-A Survey] 5 BKR [ZEITSCHRIFT FOR BANK- UND KAPITALMARKTRECHT]
399, 400 (2005) (Ger.) (noting that the act reduces the costs for plaintiffs since the costs
of ascertaining the facts are only incurred once, namely in the model proceeding, and
are then divided among all the plaintiffs).
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Coherence-based arguments come with a second, even more funda-
mental limitation. Different legal systems can and often do achieve similar
outcomes via different legal mechanisms. 12' Against that background,
arguments based on doctrinal coherence as opposed to ideology can serve
to explain the prevalence of different legal rules, but are much less suited to
explaining different outcomes.
Pretrial discovery is a case in point. Germany and France's general
rejection of pretrial discovery no doubt explains pretrial discovery's
unavailability in discrimination cases. However, pretrial discovery is not
the only way of helping plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof. The rules
on prima facie evidential burden and burden of proof can themselves be
modified to favor the plaintiff. Indeed, this latter approach plays a central
role in the continental European tradition.122 A coherence-based explana-
tion cannot explain why Germany and France do make use of it in the
context of gender discrimination law.1 23
In sum, coherence-based arguments surely have a legitimate role in
explaining the differences between gender discrimination laws on both
sides of the Atlantic. But it is difficult to see them as the driving force
behind the gulf that has opened between European and U.S. gender dis-
crimination law.
III. An Ideology-Based Explanation: Historical Background
In this part, I present an alternative explanation for the differences
between European and U.S. gender discrimination law. These differences
can best be explained by differing ideologies: European law is modeled on
a social-democratic vision of gender discrimination law whereas U.S. law
reaches more uniformly across social boundaries.
This is not to say that Title VII has an absolutely uniform impact on
employees at different levels of the corporate hierarchy.' 24 Rather, my
point is that one of the core purposes of Title VII was to allow women and
121. E.g., Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 55 (1996).
122. See, e.g., Reinhard Greger, Vor § 284: Verfahren vor den Landgerichten [Proceed-
ings Before the District Court], in ZOLLER ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG 832-36 (Reinhold Geimer
et al., eds., 25th ed. 2005) (Ger.) (discussing the general principles underlying the allo-
cation of the burden of proof under German law).
123. EU law does not stand in their way, since the relevant directive explicitly allows
the member states to adopt rules that are more generous to plaintiffs. See Directive 2006/
54/EC, supra note 22 art. 19(2).
124. Indeed, various voices in the U.S. literature have claimed that even U.S. law is
less effective at protecting women in upper-level jobs than at protecting ordinary work-
ers. See, e.g., Tracy Anbinder Baron, Comment, Keeping Women out of the Executive Suite:
The Courts' Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 267,
320 (1994) ("[Tlraditional Title VII analyses are ill-suited to the small statistical samples
and unconscious barriers that usually are associated with upper-level cases . . . .");
Ramona L. Paetzold & Rafael Gely, Through the Looking Glass: Can Title VII Help Women
and Minorities Shatter the Glass Ceiling?, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1517, 1552-53 (1995)
(stressing the difficulties that a small pool of job candidates creates for a statistical
showing of discrimination "[alt higher levels of the organization").
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minorities to gain access to all levels of the corporate hierarchy, whereas
European gender discrimination law is primarily designed to protect work-
ing-class employees.
This ideological divide did not always exist. Originally, U.S. and Euro-
pean gender discrimination laws shared a common focus on working-class
employees. However, with the adoption of Title VII-the centerpiece of
modem American antidiscrimination law-the United States made a clear
break with tradition and adopted a class-neutral model of antidiscrimina-
tion law. By contrast, no comparable change has occurred in Europe.
In this Part, I will analyze the relevant developments in Europe and the
United States. My purpose is not just to show how the different ideologies
have emerged. Rather, my account also demonstrates how ideology has
trumped path dependence: Europeans, who generally want the government
to play a central role in promoting social equality,12 5 have retained the
social-democratic approach to gender discrimination law. Americans, by
and large warier of social egalitarianism in government policies,126 have
not.
A. The United States
As early as 1918 in the United States, the War Labor Policies Board
adopted and recommended the policy that "[w]omen doing the same work
as men shall receive the same wages with such proportionate increases as
the men are receiving in the same industry."127 In 1919, Michigan and
Montana first enacted equal pay laws, and twenty other states followed suit
between 1944 and 1962.128
The first decisive step at the federal level, however, was the enactment
of the Equal Pay Act of 1963.129 In many ways, the Act encapsulates the
very essence of what I call a social-democratic approach to gender discrimi-
nation legislation.
Among the political forces driving the legislation, labor unions played
125. Cf. Alberto Alesina et al., Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans
Different?, 88 J. PUB. EcoN. 2009, 2010 (2004) ("European governments are more heav-
ily involved with redistribution than that of the United States. European fiscal systems
are more progressive than in the United States and the welfare state is more generous in
Europe, where the share of government in the economy is substantially larger than in the
United States."). A different and more complex question is whether Europeans and
Americans have different attitudes towards social equality or whether they simply differ
in the role that they allow their governments to play in this context. Some studies find
that attitudes towards equality differ in the United States and Europe. See id. at
2035-36 (finding no statistical differences regarding the effect of inequality on happi-
ness levels for American and European societies as a whole, but noting that for specific
income and ideological groups, there are significant differences in the attitudes towards
inequality between Europe and the United States).
126. See id. at 2010 (noting that the U.S. government is much less involved in the
redistribution of wealth than its European counterparts).
127. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Women in Industry,
8 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 216, 217 (1919).
128. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK, supra note 30, at
39-51 (1963) (providing an overview of the relevant statutes).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000).
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a key role.130 Esther Peterson, the director of the Woman's Bureau and the
key promoter of the Equal Pay Act,1 31 was a former lobbyist for the AFL-
CO. 3 2
The Act itself was also aimed at working-class employees. In part, this
was due to the inherent limitations of equal pay legislation. Such legisla-
tion does not offer any protection against discrimination in hiring and pro-
motions and therefore does not address the most central challenges for
high-achieving women seeking to climb the corporate ladder.
Moreover, the Equal Pay Act, as adopted in 1963, was clearly designed
with the intent to protect ordinary workers. Exempted from the equal pay
provision was "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, adminis-
trative, or professional capacity."133 In other words, women in white-collar
positions were not protected by the Act at all. This would remain the case
until 1972, when the exemption was removed.134
The lawmakers involved in the passage of the Act were well aware that
the Act would primarily benefit low-level female employees rather than
high-level ones. During the debate in the House of Representatives, an
amendment was proposed to limit investigation of potential violations to
the facts set forth in writing by the aggrieved employee.' 3 5 However, oppo-
nents of the amendment-which was ultimately rejected-argued that such
a rule would "make it incumbent on millions of rather poor and unedu-
cated persons to embark on legal processes."' 36 This line of reasoning
would be hard to comprehend if the law had been targeted at upper-level
employees, but it made perfect sense if it the Equal Pay Act was designed to
protect members of the working class.
However, in the United States, the social-democratic approach to gen-
der discrimination law was not destined to endure. The seminal change
came with the enactment of Title VII in 1964, which was further strength-
ened by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.137
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represented a clear break with
the labor-oriented legislation typified by the Equal Pay Act. Pointedly, Title
VII did not distinguish between different types of jobs, and instead applied
to all positions high or low.' 38 But the ideological shift ran much deeper
than that. Rather than being solely the fruit of the labor movement, Title
130. See generally CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEx: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S
ISSUES 89-105 (1989) (describing the events that resulted in the enactment of the Equa'
Pay Act).
131. See id. (explaining the pivotal role played by Esther Peterson).
132. Id. at 89.
133. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 13(d), 75 Stat.
65, 71 (1961) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2000)).
134. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(1), 86 Stat. 235,
375 (1972) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2000)).
135. 109 CONG. REC. 9214 (1963) (statement of Rep. Ashbrook).
136. Id. at 9215 (statement of Rep. Thompson).
137. There is considerable discussion regarding the importance of the changes
brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act.
138. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 945, 980-83 (1982) (adducing various parts of the legislative history of the Equal
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VII owed its birth to a broad bipartisan coalitionl 39 of moderate Republi-
cans and northern Democrats.140 Indeed, the role that the labor move-
ment played in its enactment is slightly ambiguous.'14 Organized labor
was initially wary of the fact that Title VII applied to unions as well as to
employers.142 Thus, while the AFL-CIO ended up as one of the staunchest
and most crucial supporters of Tide VII, this appears to have been partly
the result of some nudging on the part of President Johnson.143
Furthermore, the legislative history of Title VII makes it plain that giv-
ing minority groups-for whom Title VII had primarily been designed' 4 4-
and women equal access to upper-level jobs was among the chief goals of
Title VII. For example, the House Judiciary Committee's report points out
that "[t]wenty-two percent of white college men become proprietors, man-
agers, or officials in business while only 5 percent of [black] college men
achieve such positions."' 45 Other statements made in the legislative his-
Employment Opportunity Act in support of the claim that Title VII does not distinguish
"based on level of employment").
139. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1470, 1501 (2004).
140. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of
Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation,
151 U. PA. L. REv. 1417, 1452-98 (2003) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the
coalition behind the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
141. See Herbert Hill, Black Workers, Organized Labor, and Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act: Legislative History and Litigation Record, in RACE IN AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY 263, 263-41 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr. eds., 1993) (providing a
comprehensive analysis of the role of the labor movement in the enactment of Title VII).
142. Id. at 269-70.
143. See id. at 269 (detailing the efforts of President Johnson to gain the support of
the AFL-CIO for H.R. 7152).
144. Title VII was initially designed to protect minorities, but ended up including
women as well. This rather peculiar legislative history is described in detail in Carl M.
Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of Sex Discrimina-
tion in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HiST. 37, 37-56 (1983); and CHARLES
WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 115-17 (1985). Originally, Title VII was mainly designed to target
race discrimination and did not cover gender discrimination. See H.R. 7152, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. H§ 704(a)-(b) (1963), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963),
reprinted in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES
VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2001, 2010 [hereinafter EEOC LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY]. That Title VII ended up prohibiting gender discrimination as well was the
result of a somewhat bizarre political twist. One of the avid opponents of Title VII,
Representative Howard Smith (D) from Virginia, suggested an amendment that included
gender discrimination. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964). It is often suggested that at least
part of Smith's intention was to derail the adoption of Title VII. See, e.g., Brauer, supra,
at 45 ("[Smith] saw an opportunity to take a swipe at the civil rights bill . . . ."). But see
Mary Anne Case, Reflections on Constitutionalizing Women's Equality, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
765, 767 (2002) ("I do not think that Smith ... introduced 'sex' into Title VII as a joke or
simply as 'a southern attempt to incite a filibuster."'). However, if this was Smith's
agenda, his strategy backfired. Various female representatives from both parties
declared their support. See 110 CONG. REc. 2578-84 (1964). The amendment was
accepted and remained part of Title VII as it was later adopted. See 110 CONG. REC.
2584 (1964).
145. H.R. REP. No. 88-914, reprinted in EEOC LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 144, at
2001, 2157.
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tory also emphasize the awareness that Title VII would open up the upper
echelons of private enterprise. 146
This function of Title VII became even clearer with the adoption of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act in 1972.147 Indeed, the legislative his-
tory of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act is awash with statements
that stress the need for ethnic minorities' 48 and women149 to have access
146. See 110 CONG. REc. 8452-53 (1964) (statement of Rep. Javits) (referring to
reports indicating that "nonwhites ... are frequently compelled to accept unskilled or
semiskilled jobs"); 110 CONG. REc. 12619 (1964) (statement of Rep. Muskie) ("If we are
to promote the general welfare, we must make it possible for all Americans to gain the
education and training necessary for them to find and obtain jobs utilizing their full
potential.").
147. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1970 ed. Suppl. 5).
148. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 92-238 (1971), reprinted in
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 61, 77
[hereinafter EEOA 1972 LEGISLATVE HISTORY] ("The report found that ... most white-
collar jobs were found to be largely inaccessible to minority persons. For example, in
Atlanta and Baton Rouge, there were no blacks in city managerial positions."); 117
CONG. REc. 31967 (1971) (statement of Rep. Anderson) (noting that "although blacks
constitute 10 percent of the American labor force, eight out of 10 male black workers are
concentrated in occupations that are grouped along the three lowest rungs of the eco-
nomic ladder in terms of income"); 117 CONG. REC. 31976 (1971) (statement of Rep.
Drinan) ("As of May 30, 1970, minorities accounted for 19.4 percent of the total number
of Federal employees. But minorities constitute only 2 percent of individuals in the GS-
16 through GS-18 grades."); 117 CONG. REC. 32106 (1971) (statement of Rep. Leggett)
(acknowledging "sincere efforts [on the part of corporations] to recruit black graduates
for management positions," but noting that "we have a long way to go."); S. COMM. ON
LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, H.R. REP. No. 92-415 (1971), reprinted in EEOA 1972 LEGISLA-
nvE HISTORY, supra, at 410, 415-16 (noting that African Americans "hold only 1% of
professional and managerial positions" and that they "are precluded from high-paying
executive positions."); H.R. REP. No. 92-415 (1971), reprinted in EEOA 1972 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra, at 410, 422-23 (pointing out that in educational institutions, "minorities
and women are precluded from the more prestigious and higher-paying positions ....
and that, with respect to the federal government, "[t]he inordinate concentration of
women in the lower grade levels and their conspicuous absence from the higher grades
is again evident"). Cf. 117 CONG. REc. 32101 (1971) (statement of Rep. Badillo)
(stressing with respect to the federal civil service, that those "Spanish-speaking Ameri-
cans ... fortunate enough to be employed by Uncle Sam are heavily concentrated in the
lower grade levels," while "only 17 Spanish-speaking persons ... hold supergrade posi-
tions . . . in the entire Federal Establishment").
149. See, e.g., H. COMM. ON EDUc. & LABOR, H.R. REP. No. 92-238 (1971), reprinted in
EEOA 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 61, 80 ("When they have been hired
into educational institutions . .. women have been relegated to positions of lesser stand-
ing than their male counterparts."); H.R. REP. No. 92-238, reprinted in EEOA 1972 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 61, 83 (noting that "the majority of [minority and
female] employees are at the lower levels of government employment"); SUBCOMM. ON
LABOR OF THE S. COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, H.R. 1746, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in EEOA 1972 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 191, 195 (statement of
Rep. Martin) ("In [1968], 60 percent of women, but only 20 percent of men earned less
than $5,000 while, at the other end of the scale, only 3 percent of women, but 28 per-
cent of men had earnings of $10,000 or more."); H.R. 1746, reprinted in EEOA 1972
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 191, 239 (statement of Rep. Nix) ("The conclu-
sion is that women and minority group workers .. . still are largely underrepresented in
the more remunerative jobs of private industry."); H.R. 1746, reprinted in EEOA 1972
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 148, at 191, 240 (statement of Rep. Nix) (citing a news-
paper article from the Washington Star, Sept. 12, 1971, reporting that "[iun 1970,
49
Cornell International Law Journal
to upper-level jobs. In sum, when the U.S. Congress included gender dis-
crimination in Title VII, it not only broadened gender discrimination law,
but also put it on a different conceptual basis: Social-democratic ideology
was replaced by a class-neutral vision of gender discrimination law.
B. Europe
European law has developed in a fundamentally different direction.
Just like the United States, the European Union and member states such as
Germany and France started out with a social-democratic approach to gen-
der discrimination law. But unlike the United States, Europe never aban-
doned the social-democratic vision of gender discrimination law. Instead,
its law is still geared towards the protection of working-class women.
1. Before the Founding of the European Economic Community
The birth of gender discrimination law in Europe predates the found-
ing of the European Union-then known as the European Economic Com-
munity-in 1957. In the following sections, I will analyze the development
of gender discrimination law in France and Germany, which, together with
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, were among the Euro-
pean Economic Community's founding members.
a. France
French gender discrimination law has its origins in the first half of the
twentieth century. In 1919, France enacted its first legislation on collective
bargaining agreements. 150 In 1936, the French legislature amended the
law to allow for the first time the extension of collective bargaining agree-
ments to employees and employers who were not part of the unions and
employer associations that had concluded the agreement.'15 Some of these
collective agreements contained equal pay provisions, while many others
did not.152
The rise of autonomously negotiated collective bargaining agreements
women made up 34 percent of the total working force, but only 2.7 percent held mana-
gerial positions, as opposed to 12.4 percent of the men."); 117 CONG. REc. 32,095
(1971) (statement of Rep. Fountroy) ("The difficulties of minorities and women in secur-
ing Federal employment, their high concentration in low level jobs, their virtual absence
from executive level positions, can only be attributed to systematic and institutional fail-
ures . . . ."); 117 CONG. REC. 32,103 (1971) (statement of Rep. Fraser) (noting that
"minority groups and women hold the lowest paying jobs, are the first to be laid off
during cutbacks, have few benefits and in many areas are systematically discriminated
against moving into jobs involving greater skills and training"); 117 CONG. REc. 32,104
(1971) (statement of Rep. Fraser) ("The percentage of women in top Government jobs-
1.5%-shows that the Federal Government itself contains systematic discrimination.").
150. GEORG STEINMANN & HEINz GOLDSCHMIDT, GEWERKSCHAFTEN UND FRAGEN DES KOL-
LEKTIVEN ARBEITSRECHTS IN GROSBRITANNIEN, FRANKREICH, BELGIEN, DEN NIEDERLANDEN UND
ITALIEN 65 (1957) (Ger.).
151. Id.
152. International Labor Office, Employment of Women in France, 55 INT'L LAB. REv.
549, 552 (1947).
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came to an abrupt end, however, with the arrival of World War 11.153 An
act passed on July 11, 1938, concerning the general organization of the
nation in time of war154 gave the Minister of Labor the power to regulate
the conditions of employment.' 5 5 On the basis of that legislation, the Min-
istry of Labor soon started intervening forcefully in the setting of wages,
culminating in a freeze in 1939.156 This meant that the prevailing practice
of paying women less than men was now legally sanctioned. In the ensu-
ing years, with much of France occupied by Nazi Germany, the law would
become even less favorable for women. Regulations adopted in 1943 and
1944 mandated that women be paid 20-30% less than men for the same
work.157 In other words, wage discrimination against female workers was
not only allowed, but positively required by law. Thus, when World War II
and the German occupation of France ended, the new French government
inherited an economy in which wages were tightly controlled by the gov-
ernment and women had to be paid less than men.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the new French government
revoked these regulations.158 Crucially, though, the relevant decree-
which consisted of a single sentence-did not prohibit discrimination
against female workers. It simply abolished the earlier decrees that had
required unequal salaries.' 59
Nor did the French law guarantee gender equality in employment by
other means. The preamble to the French Constitution of 1946-the con-
stitution of the Fourth Republic that lasted until 1958-addressed the situ-
ation of women. It specifically provided that "[tihe law guarantees women
equal rights to those of men in all spheres."1 60 However, at the time, that
preamble was not thought to be legally binding,161 and no statutory law
implemented the principle of gender equality in the area of employ-
153. See generally International Labor Office, Social Legislation in Wartime, 40 INT'L
LAB. REv. 641, 641-50 (1939) (summarizing legislation on the regulation of employ-
ment in wartime that was adopted between 1938 and 1939).
154. Loi du 11 juillet 1938 [Law of July 11, 1938], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE [J.0.] [OFFCIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 13, 1938, p. 8330.
155. International Labor Office, Social Legislation in Wartime, 40 INT'L LAB. REV. 641,
646-47 (1939).
156. See Les salairesftminins, 10 DROIT SoCIAL 26, 27 (1947) (Fr.); B. Piguet, L'Egalite
des Salaires Masculins et Feminins, 2 REVUE FRANCAISE DU TRAVAIL 419, 425 (1947) (Fr.).
157. See Les salairesfeminins, supra note 156, at 27; Piguet, supra note 156, at 425-26.
158. See Les salairesfeiminins, supra note 156, at 27.
159. Dicret du 30 jullet 1946 [Decree of July 30, 1946] art. I, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.0.1 [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 3, 1946, at 6897-98
(Fr.).
160. 1946 CONST. pmbl., reprinted in GENEVIEVE KOUBI Er AL., LE PREAMBULE DE LA
CONsTITuTION DE 1946-ANTINOMIES JURIDIQUES ET CONTRADICTIONS POLITIQUES 291-92
(1996) (translation by author).
161. GEORGE RIPERT, LE DECLIN DU DROIT 17 (1949) (Fr.). Indeed, scholars at the time
could not even agree as to whether the Preamble could have any legal relevance at all.
See Yves Poirmeur, La reception du Preambule de la Constitution de 1946 par la doctrine
juridique, in KoUBI ET AL., supra note 160, at 120-23 (1996) (Fr.) (providing an overview
of the discussion).
51
Cornell International Law Journal
ment.162 Real steps toward imposing a principle of equal treatment came
some time later and were distinctly labor-oriented in nature.
In 1950, France enacted a new statute on collective bargaining.163
That statute explicitly required collective bargaining agreements to contain
provisions on the principle of equal pay for equal work. 164 In effect, the
statute entrusted the implementation of equal pay to organized labor.
More importantly, equal pay was guaranteed only in the presence of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Due to the weakness of the labor unions in the
post-war era, however, collective bargaining agreements failed to become
widely accepted until later years.16 5
For that reason, the second feature of the 1950 statute acquired cen-
tral importance.166 The 1950 statute called on the French government to
prescribe, via governmental decree, a minimum wage for all French work-
ers.167 This minimum wage, the salaire minimum interprofessionnel garanti
[SMIG], later renamed salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance
[SMIC], did not distinguish between male and female workers.16 8 Thus, it
guaranteed equal wages to men and women at the bottom of the pay scale.
But of course, this legislation on minimum wages did nothing to help
upper-level employees.
b. Germany
In Germany, the marriage between the labor movement and the devel-
opment of employment discrimination law was similarly close. To prop-
erly understand the relevant developments, one has to go back to the
drafting of the German Constitution. That task was entrusted to the so-
162. See generally Danile Alexandre, The Status of Women in France, 20 AM. J. Comp.
L. 647, 655 (1972) ("[As of 1972,] neither with respect to access to certain professions
nor remuneration has the principle of equality been fully implemented.").
163. Loi 50-205 du 11 fvrier 1950 [Law No. 50-205 of Feb. 11, 1950], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 12, 1950, at 1688
(Fr.).
164. Id. at 1689.
165. Cf. Arthur M. Ross, Western Europe: Italy and France, 16 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
63, 82 (1962) ("[U]ntil recently, France was not successful in re-establishing collective
bargaining of any kind on a widespread basis."). On the relative weakness of the French
labor unions, see also Arnold R. Weber, The Structure of Collective Bargaining and Bar-
gaining Power: Foreign Experiences, 6J.L. & ECON. 79, 80 (1963), for a comparison of ten
countries, noting that "[o]nly in France and Japan are unions relatively less prominent
than in the United States."
166. See, e.g., STEINMANN & GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 150, at 67 (explaining that in
light of the weakness of the labor unions and employer associations in 1957, it was not
surprising that the governmentally-fixed minimum wage played the central role).
167. Loi 50-205 11 f&vrier 1950 [Law No. 50-205 of Feb. 11, 1950], JOURNAL OFFICIEL
DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAs [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 12, 1950, art. 31x,
at 1690 (Fr.).
168. Decret du 8 Sept. 1951 portant fixation du salaire national minimum inter-
professionnel garanti [Decree of Sept. 8, 1951 on the Setting of the National Universal
Minimum Wage], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANAIs [J..] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF FRANCE], Sept. 20, 1951, at 9476 (Fr.) (setting the minimum hourly wage for both
men and women at 86.5 Francs and-for those working in the region of Paris-at 100
Francs).
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called Parliamentarian Council (Parlamentarischer Rat), whose work lasted
from 1948 to 1949.169
Gender equality in employment proved to be a contentious issue from
the start. When it was first discussed in the Committee for Fundamental
Questions (Ausschuss fir Grundsatzfragen), the social-democratic members
of the committee and the sole communist representative wanted the Consti-
tution to explicitly enshrine the principle of equal pay for equal work.170
By contrast, the committee chair from the conservative Christian Demo-
cratic Union, Hermann von Mangoldt, argued that the question of equal
employment opportunities ought to be governed by statutory law, not the
Constitution. 171
The question was deferred after the committee failed to a reach a con-
sensus. 172 Later, the committee agreed on a draft of the bill of rights. In
its article on equal treatment, the draft bill of rights included gender as a
criterion upon which discrimination was not allowed.173 The committee
then discussed whether the provision should be further amended to
include an explicit right to equal pay. This provision was supported not
only by the representatives of the social-democratic party and the commu-
nist party,174 but also by the sole female representative of the Christian
Democratic Union, Helene Weber, who expressed her interest in seeing a
right to equal pay anchored in the Constitution.17 5
In light of opposition from within his own party, von Mangoldt modi-
fied his earlier view on equal pay. He now argued that an explicit equal
pay provision was unnecessary because such a guarantee was already
implicit in the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender.176 The
problem with von Mangoldt's argument was that a separate provision of the
draft explicitly provided that the "basic rights"-which included the prohi-
bition against discrimination on the basis of gender-were binding on the
legislature, the administration, and the courts.' 77 Private parties such as
employers were not mentioned among those bound by the basic rights.178
169. See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation,
Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s-1950s, 113 YALE LJ. 1341,
1387 (2004) (noting that the Parliamentarian Council was entrusted with drafting the
German Constitution).
170. EBERHART PIKART & WOLFRAM WERNER, DER PARLAMENTARISCHE RAT 1948-1949:
AKTEN UND PROTOKOLLE [FILES AND PROTOCOLS], VOLUME 5/1: AuSSCHUSS FOR GRUNDSATZ-
FRAGEN [COMMITTEE FOR POLICY ISSUES], X-XXI, at 142 (1993) (Ger.).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Art. 1-21 in der vom Grundsatzausschug in zweiter Lesung angenommenen
Fassung, at 784-88, art. 4(3), reprinted in PIKART & WERNER, supra note 170, at 142
("Niemand darf seines Geschlechts ... wegen benachteiligt oder bevorzugt werden [No
one shall be disfavored or favored because of his gender.]").
174. Sechsundzwanzigste Sitzung des Ausschusses fur Grundsatzfragen Nov. 30,
1948, reprinted in PIKART & WERNER, supra note 170, at 712, 752.
175. PIKART & WERNER, supra note 170, at 712, 752.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 784.
178. Id. at 752.
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One of the other committee members promptly pointed out this limitation
of the basic rights.' 79
However, von Mangoldt was not about to give in so easily. He simply
refined his reasoning by stating that while individual employment con-
tracts were not covered by the existing provision on equal treatment, collec-
tive bargaining agreements that were extended by the administration to
non-unionized employees could no longer provide for unequal wages
because the extension was necessarily governmental in nature.' 80
Von Mangoldt's argument carried the day. Once satisfied that adminis-
tratively-sanctioned collective bargaining agreements were covered by the
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of gender, the other com-
mittee members no longer called for an explicit equal pay provision.18
The German Constitution thus did not, and still does not, contain any
explicit guarantee of equal pay.'s 2
Moreover, the German judiciary would later adopt an approach that
more or less corresponded to the compromise made by the Committee for
Fundamental Questions. In the leading 1955 case, the federal labor court
(Bundesarbeitsgericht) -the highest court for labor and employment mat-
ters-held that collective bargaining agreements were bound to respect the
principle of equal pay for equal work.183 At the same time, it explicitly
exempted individual employment contracts from its holding.' 84
The fact that the German federal labor court limited the scope of the
equal pay guarantee to collective bargaining agreements meant that the
equal-pay principle protected working-class women much more effectively
than women aspiring to upper-level jobs. Working-class employees in Ger-
many are typically paid the wages specified in collective bargaining agree-
ments.185 By contrast, the salaries of upper-level employees are typically
negotiated individually, and accordingly, the rule that collective bargaining
agreements cannot discriminate based on gender does not protect upper-
level employees.186
Thus, the original German approach to gender equality in employ-
ment very much fit the social-democratic pattern of antidiscrimination leg-
islation. Not only was the political left the staunchest advocate for the
equal-pay principle, but the equal pay principle's limited application to col-
lective bargaining agreements meant that, in practice, it only protected
working-class employees.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 753.
181. Id. at 752-53.
182. See GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLICK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDEGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAw], May 23, 1949, BGBI I, art. 3 (Ger.) (containing various prohibitions against
discrimination but no explicit guarantee of equal wages for men and women).
183. Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Jan. 15, 1955, 8 NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 685 (686) (Ger.).
184. Id.
185. See supra Part III.B.A.
186. Id.
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2. The Founding of the European Economic Community
1957 saw the creation of the European Economic Community, which
would later become the European Union. Among the provisions of the
founding treaty, the so-called Treaty of Rome, was Article 119, which guar-
anteed equal pay for men and women.18 7
Article 119 went on to become the heart of European gender discrimi-
nation law. But unlike Title VII, it did not break with the social-democratic
ideology underlying previous gender discrimination law. To the contrary,
Article 119 represented an attempt to preserve the status quo, not to
change it. Its inclusion into the Treaty of Rome was due to the pressure of
the French government, whereas the other parties to the treaty were either
opposed or without strong preferences.188 French employers, concerned
about suffering a competitive disadvantage, had pushed for a community-
wide equal-wage guarantee.189
The design of Article 119 reflected its historical purpose: Article 119
was embedded in the Treaty's chapter on "social provisions," introduced
with the statement in the preamble that the member states "agree upon the
need to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard
of living for workers."1 90 The immediately preceding article called on the
European Commission to try to "develop the dialogue between manage-
ment and labor."191 In sum, Article 119 was the very paradigm of a social-
democratic approach to gender discrimination law.
IV. The Lasting Allure of the Social-Democratic Model
Of course, Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome was not the end of Euro-
pean gender discrimination law. Based on the provision, the Court of Jus-
tice developed a comprehensive case law on discrimination, and various
directives and regulations were adopted to implement the principle of gen-
der equality.192 However, the legal system that emerged remains beholden
to the social-democratic model, as I will demonstrate below.
A. Substantive Law
As explained in Part I, the substantive prohibitions against gender dis-
crimination are much more comprehensive in the United States than in
Europe.
187. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 119, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome] ("Each Member State shall in the course of
the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle of
equal remuneration for equal work as between men and women workers.").
188. CATHERINE HosKYNS, INTEGRATING GENDER: WOMEN, LAW, AND POLITICS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 55 (1996) (explaining the French demand for equal pay and noting
that "Dutch officials tried hard to narrow the scope of what was agreed" while "[o]ther
delegations appeared at different times confused, complaisant or indifferent . .
189. Id.
190. Treaty of Rome, supra note 187, art. 117(1).
191. Id. art. 118b.
192. See HOSKYNS, supra note 188, at 78-93.
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1. Part-time Workers and Employees at Small Firms
Two of the most striking differences between the gender discrimina-
tion laws in the United States and Europe concern part-time workers and
employees of small enterprises. In the United States, Title VII does not
apply to employers with less than 15 employees, whereas the EU prohibi-
tions against discrimination contain no such exemption.' 93 And whereas
U.S. courts have held that part-time workers are not comparable to full-
time employees, European law now explicitly prohibits discrimination
based on an employee's part-time status.' 94
The differences in the treatment of part-time workers and small-firm
employees make sense, however, in light of the ideological divide. Given
the relatively class-neutral approach that Title VII takes to gender discrimi-
nation, there is no reason for U.S. lawmakers and courts to go out of their
way to protect part-time and small-firm employees. At most, one might
question why U.S. law treats small-firm employees worse than other
employees by exempting them from the protection of Title VII. But even
this distinction is completely in line with a general tendency in U.S. law to
exempt small firms from regulation.' 95
For the European Union, by contrast, the situation presents itself in an
altogether different light. Given the social-democratic ideals of European
gender discrimination law, it is expected that EU law is particularly con-
cerned about workers who find themselves at the bottom of the corporate
hierarchy. And both part-time workers and small-time employees are more
likely than other employees to fit that description.
Consider, first, the situation of part-time employees. Such employees
are disproportionately likely to be low-wage workers. For example, in
France in 2011, 25.2% of part-time workers were paid the legal minimum
wage (SMIC),1 96 more than twice the overall percentage (full-time and part-
time).197 In Germany, which has no general minimum wage, 61% of part-
time workers engage in low-wage work versus only 14% of full-time
workers.198
The same pattern obtains in the United States, where in 2009, 11% of
part-time workers were paid at or below the minimum wage, compared
193. Civil Rights Act tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (2000).
194. See Directive 97/81/EC, supra note 43, annex cl. 4(1).
195. Cf. Ronald F. Wilson, Federal Tax Policy: The Political Influence ofAmerican Small
Business, 37 S. TEx. L. REv. 15, 17 (1996) (stressing that the Internal Revenue Code is
replete with exemptions in favor of small businesses).
196. Proportion de salaries rbmuneres sur la base du SMIC en 2011 [Proportion of
Employees Paid on the Basis of Minimum Wage in 2011], INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATIS-
TIQUE ET DES ETUDES EcONOMIQUES, http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/?tableau.asp?ref-id=
NATTEF04112&reg-id=0.
197. Id. (indicating that 10.6% of all employees were paid the minimum wage in
2011).
198. These percentages are derived from data presented by Thorsten Kalina & Clau-
dia Weinkopf, Weitere Zunahme der Niedriglohnbeschaftigung: 2006 bereits rund 6,5 Mil-
lionen Beschaftigte betroffen, 2 IAQ-REPORT 6 (2008). Low-wage work is defined as work
that pays two thirds of the median wage or less. Id. at 2.
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with only 2.2% of full-time workers. 199
In other words, part-time workers in the United States and Europe are
similarly situated inasmuch as they are disproportionately likely to do low-
wage work. What differs is the legal treatment of part-time workers. They
simply receive better protection against discrimination in Europe than in
the United States. Differing ideologies provide a plausible explanation for
this divide: A class-neutral system of gender discrimination law may be
willing to ignore the plight of part-time workers, but a social-democratic
system cannot.
A similar picture emerges with respect to small-firm employees. There
can be no doubt that a Title VII-style exemption for small firms has a dis-
proportionate impact on low-income workers. The reason is simple: Small
firms are much more likely to employ low-wage workers. 200 Of course, this
is a generalization, as many small-firm employees are extremely well paid.
Associate lawyers at boutique law firms or doctors come to mind. But over-
all, employees at small firms are much more likely to be low-wage workers
than their counterparts at larger firms. 20 1 In light of the different ideolo-
gies of European and American gender discrimination laws, this has obvi-
ous consequences. Given its social-democratic orientation, European law
can hardly be expected to grant small-firm employees less protection than
employees at larger firms.
2. Wage Discrimination and Disparate Impact
Another conspicuous difference between EU law and U.S. law con-
cerns the role of disparate impact analysis in wage discrimination. U.S.
courts have declined to apply disparate impact analysis in the context of
the Equal Pay Act.202 By contrast, in EU law, it is well-established that
employers may not engage in indirect discrimination with respect to
wages. 203
199. Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers: 2009, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
tabl.9 (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.bls.gov/cps/minwage2009tbls.htm.
200. See, e.g., FREDRIK ANDERSSON, HARRY HOLZER, &JULIA LANE, THE INTERACTIONS OF
WORKERS AND FIRMS IN THE LOW-WAGE LABOR MARKET 18 (2002), available at http://
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410608_1owwage.pdf (noting that "low earners are more
heavily concentrated in small establishments than in larger ones"); Lisa M. Lynch, Devel-
opment Intermediaries and the Training of Low-Wage Workers, in EMERGING LABOR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 293, 295 (Richard B. Freeman et al. eds.,
2005) (noting that "low earners are more heavily concentrated in small establishments
than in larger ones").
201. MARK BERGER ET AL., DISTRIBUTION OF LOW-WAGE WORKERS BY FIRM SIZE IN THE
UNITED STATES 8 (1999), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/?rsl96tot.pdf;
see also KIRSTA GLENN, MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS IN WASHINGTON STATE 12 (2003), availa-
ble at http://www.workforceexplorer.com/admin/uploadedPublications/?988_Mini-
mumWageArticle.pdf ("[O]nly 2.3 percent of workers in large firms earn minimum
wage. This compares to six percent for small firms . . . .").
202. See, e.g., AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985); de
Lange, supra note 45, at 349 n.285.
203. See Directive 2006/54/EC, supra note 22 art. 4 (explicitly prohibiting indirect
discrimination with respect to remuneration).
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Once again, the stricter European position is fully consistent with the
social-democratic vision of gender discrimination law. The Court of Jus-
tice first adopted the concept of disparate impact discrimination-or "indi-
rect discrimination"-in its famous Bilka decision.204 The facts of that case
are illuminating: Bilka was a German limited liability company that was
part of a group of companies running department stores. 205 As part of its
employment contracts, Bilka offered its employees a pension scheme.
However, part-time employees were excluded from that scheme unless they
had also worked full-time for at least 15 years. 206 The case eventually
reached the Bundesarbeitsgericht, the highest German court in matters of
labor and employment law. Under the so-called preliminary rulings proce-
dure, the Bundesarbeitsgericht referred various questions to the European
Court of Justice. 207 In particular, the Bundesarbeitsgericht wanted to
know whether a policy "excluding part-time employees from an occupa-
tional pension scheme constitutes discrimination . . . where that exclusion
affects a far greater number of women than men."1208 In other words, the
question of indirect discrimination did not arise in a vacuum. It was
closely tied to another question-namely that of how to protect part-time
workers most of whom were female. And as explained in the previous sec-
tion, the protection of part-time workers is a primary concern for the
social-democratic model of gender discrimination law.
To be sure, it is not difficult to also come up with other reasons why
disparate impact analysis should apply to wage discrimination. In particu-
lar, one could argue that it is somewhat contradictory for a legal system to
apply disparate impact analysis to the hiring, promotion, and termination
context but not to wages. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the way in
which EU law diverges from U.S. law on this issue once again corresponds
quite neatly to the peculiar ideological underpinning of EU gender discrim-
ination law.
B. Remedies, Procedure, and Rules Governing the Burden of Proof
Perhaps the most important difference between gender discrimination
laws in the United States and Europe concerns remedies, procedural rules,
and the burden of proof. As explained in Part Two, the European law on
remedies and procedures threatens to undermine the effectiveness of the
substantive prohibitions against discrimination. It is very difficult for Euro-
pean plaintiffs to prove gender discrimination because the threshold for
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is high, 209 and plaintiffs
cannot even avail themselves of pretrial discovery to obtain the necessary
information. 210 Moreover, the deterrence value of gender discrimination
204. Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v. Weber von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1620.
205. See id. para. 3.
206. Id. para. 4.
207. Id. para. 8.
208. Id. para. 24.
209. See supra Part L.B.4.
210. See supra Part I.B.1.
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suits is limited since employers do not have to fear class action lawsuits or
punitive damages. 211
However, the social-democratic model of gender discrimination law
can plausibly explain these apparent weaknesses. The key is to realize that
gender discrimination litigation is not the only way to protect workers
against discrimination. To some extent, general rules of labor and employ-
ment law can serve the same function. Rules requiring that employees can
only be dismissed for cause illustrate this point. Inter alia, such rules
require employers to articulate a reason for any dismissal and thereby offer
some protection against discriminatory dismissals. 212
In line with their more social-democratic ideals, many continental
European countries boast labor and employment laws that are far more
generous to workers than the corresponding laws in the United States.2 13
As I will explain below, some of these rules effectively compensate for the
lack of meaningful enforcement mechanisms in gender discrimination
law.214
Crucially, though, the European reliance on the general rules of labor
and employment law as a bulwark against gender discrimination has a seri-
ous drawback: The relevant rules in labor and employment law are geared
towards the needs of ordinary workers and are much less effective at pro-
tecting employees with managerial aspirations.
Therefore, any legal system seeking to grant effective protection against
discrimination across legal boundaries would strive to complement the
general rules of labor and employment law with additional protections for
upper-level workers. The easiest way to do that would be to create strong
remedies and powerful procedural rules to enforce the general prohibitions
against discrimination.
However, countries adhering to a social-democratic model of gender
discrimination law will be less inclined to take such steps. After all, if the
main purpose of the rules against gender discrimination is to protect work-
ing-class employees against such discrimination, and, if the general rules of
labor and employment law already provide effective protection for working-
class employees, why engage in additional political battles-and increase
the regulatory burden on employers-to create additional protections?
In sum, social-democratic ideals matter on two levels. First, continen-
tal European countries are more likely to boast rules in labor and employ-
211. See supra Part I.B.2-3.
212. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
213. See infra Part IV.B.1-3.
214. Ironically, the reverse is also true. Accordingly, antidiscrimination laws in the
United States may be particularly strong in part because they had to substitute for the
lack of more general social legislation. As Theda Skopcol has persuasively shown, early
gender-specific legislation protecting women at the workplace enjoyed the support not
only of women's groups, but also of male-dominated unions in part because it was seen
as a step towards achieving protections for workers more generally. See, e.g., THEDA
SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE PoLTCAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN
THE UNITED STATES 379 (1995) (arguing that "[hlours limits for women are better under-
stood as part of a broader aspiration by, and for, virtually all American workers").
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ment law that are highly favorable to workers. Some of these rules-like
the rule that workers can only be dismissed for cause -are difficult to imag-
ine in a country like the United States that is less open to a social-demo-
cratic vision of society.
Second, and just as importantly, social-democratic countries are less
likely to be concerned with the fact that the general rules of gender dis-
crimination law are ineffective at protecting upper-level workers against
discrimination. Accordingly, such countries cannot necessarily be
expected to complement the general rules of labor and employment law
with more specialized protections.
Among the general rules and institutions of labor and employment
law, three are particularly important to the battle against discrimination:
collective bargaining agreements, for-cause-termination rules, and so-called
works councils. In the following section, I will explain why these institu-
tions offer protection against discrimination and why they are better at
protecting working-class employees than employees in upper-level jobs.
1. Collective Bargaining Agreements
Collective bargaining agreements play a crucial role in protecting
French and German employees against their employers. Cross-country
data proves illuminating. A 1997 study by the OECD reports the percent-
age of employees covered by collective bargaining agreements to be only
18% in the United States, but 92% in Germany and 95% in France.2 15 A
more recent study by the European Commission arrives at somewhat lower
figures for Germany, but nonetheless confirms the overriding importance
that collective bargaining agreements have for European workers. The per-
centage of employees covered in 2001 was found to be around 95% in
France and between 60% and 65% in Germany.216 Data from a variety of
other sources paints a similar picture. 217 Moreover, the numbers for
France and Germany are representative of the situation in many other
European countries. 218
215. ORGANIzATION FOR EcONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, EMPLOYMENT OUT-
LOOK 71, tbl.3.3 (1997) [hereinafter OECD STUDY].
216. DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR EMPLOYMENT AND SociAL AFFAIRS, INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS IN EUROPE 30, chart 1.5 (2004).
217. The percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements has been
estimated at 13.8% in the United States in 2004, 95% in France in 2003, and 63% in
Germany in 1997. Jelle Visser, Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries, 129
MONTvLY LABOR REV. 38, 46 tbl.4 (2006). Another study reported survey data demon-
strating that the percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements dif-
fered widely across portions of Germany. Collective bargaining agreements covered
62.1% of workers in West Germany, but only 42.6% of East German workers were simi-
larly covered. Claus Schabel, Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbande: Organisation-
sgrade, Tarifbindung und Einfliisse auf Lohne und Beschaftigung [ Unions and Employer
Associations: Membership Density, Bargaining Coverage, and Impact on Wages and Employ-
ment], 38 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR ARBEITSMARKFORSCHUNG [ZAF] 181, 189 (2005) (Ger.).
218. Visser, supra note 217, at 46, tbl.4 (reporting coverage rates for the United King-
dom (35%), the Netherlands (82%), Sweden (92%), Norway (77%), Finland (95%),
Spain (81%), and Austria (99%)).
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Why are so many more workers covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments in Europe than in the United States? In part, the higher coverage
rates reflect the fact that European employees are much more likely than
U.S. workers to be union members.219 However, just as importantly, Euro-
pean legal systems often allow wider impact for collective bargaining agree-
ments even for those employers and employees who are not members of the
relevant employer associations or trade unions. For example, in France220
and Germany221, the law explicitly authorizes the administration to extend
the scope of collective bargaining agreements beyond those individuals
belonging to unions and employer associations. The importance of this
feature can be most clearly observed in France, where, according to the
OECD study, only 9% of workers are unionized, but 95% are covered by
collective bargaining agreements. 222
When coupled with statutory prohibitions against gender discrimina-
tion, collective bargaining agreements offer considerable protection against
wage discrimination. To the extent that the wage paid for a certain type of
work is fixed in a collective bargaining agreement irrespective of gender,
female workers paid according to that agreement are guaranteed the same
pay as male workers for the same work.2 2 3
However, collective bargaining agreements only specify the minimum
219. The 1997 OECD study indicates that while 16% of U.S. workers are reported to
be union members, the relevant figures for France, Germany, and Italy are 9%, 29%, and
39%, respectively. OECD STUDY, supra note 215, at 71, tbl.3.3. More recent data indi-
cates that union membership has decreased in all countries. For 2003, union member-
ship was estimated to be 12.4% in the United States, 22.6% in Germany, 8.3% in
France, and 33.7% in Italy. Visser, supra note 217, at 45, tbl. 3. At least in the United
States, this downward trend appears to be continuing. Thus, in the year 2007, only
12.1% of U.S. workers were union members. James A. Walker, Union Members in 2007:
A Visual Essay, 131 MONTHLY LABOR REv. 28, 29 (2008).
220. French law provides for two mechanisms by which the minister in charge of
labor (ministre charge du travail) can extend the coverage of collective bargaining agree-
ments. The less far-reaching step, the so-called extension, declares collective bargaining
agreements binding on all employers and employees falling within their general scope of
application, even though they may not be members of the relevant unions or employer
associations. See CODE DU TRAVAIL [C. TRAv.] art. L 2261-15 (Fr.) (describing precondi-
tions for extension of collective bargaining agreements). The more far-reaching measure
is the so-called elargissement, by which a collective bargaining agreement can be declared
binding for employers in geographical areas or industries that the collective bargaining
agreement does not purport to cover. Id. art. L 2261-17.
221. Tarifvertragsgesetz [TVG] [Collective Bargaining Agreement Act], Aug. 25, 1969,
BGBI I at 1223, last amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 31, 2006, BGBI I at 2407, § 5(1) (Ger.).
This provision authorizes the Federal Department for Labor and Social Affairs, if certain
conditions are met, to declare collective bargaining agreements universally binding.
Once the collective bargaining agreement has been declared universally binding, it cov-
ers, within its scope of application, even those employers and employees who would not
otherwise be bound. Id. § 5(3).
222. OECD STUDY, supra note 215, at 71, tbl.3.3.
223. The economic literature tends to confirm that collective bargaining agreements
tend to protect women against discrimination. See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M.
Kahn, Understanding International Differences in the Gender Pay Gap, 21 J. LAB. EcoN.
106, 139 (2003) (analyzing cross-country data and finding that "the extent of collective-
bargaining coverage in each country is significantly negatively related to the gender gap"
meaning that the gap between female workers' salaries and male workers' salaries tends
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that the employer has to pay employees for certain types of work.2 2 4 By
contrast, they do not prevent the employer from paying wages that exceed
those specified in the collective bargaining agreement. 225 Accordingly, the
existence of a collective bargaining agreement does not prevent discrimina-
tion where female employees are paid the wages specified in the collective
bargaining agreement while male workers receive even higher wages.
Regarding working-class employees, this is not a problem, since, in prac-
tice, most working-class employees are only paid the wages specified in
collective bargaining agreements.22 6 But upper-level employees are a differ-
ent matter. Unlike working-class employees, upper-level employees are
often paid individually-negotiated salaries that exceed the lower bounds set
by collective bargaining agreements.2 27 And, as pointed out above, the
wages specified in collective bargaining agreements cannot protect against
discrimination where an employer discriminates by paying at least one
party wages that exceed those specified in the bargaining agreement.
In addition, there is another reason why collective bargaining agree-
ments are ineffective at protecting upper-level employees against discrimi-
nation: Such agreements may simply fail to set wages for the work done by
managerial employees. Indeed, such is the rule in France 228 and Ger-
many,22 9 where jobs held by managerial employees typically do not fall
within the scope of collective bargaining agreements.
Why do collective bargaining agreements often neglect to govern the
wages of managerial employees? Complexity is one factor. The fact that
managerial positions tend to be less standardized than rank-and-file jobs
makes it difficult for collective bargaining agreements to specify attractive
wage levels for managerial employees. But the structure of labor unions
also presents a challenge for managerial employees. Given that unions
tend to be dominated by rank-and-file employees whose numbers vastly
exceed those of managerial employees, labor unions can hardly be
to be smaller in countries where more employment relationships are governed by collec-
tive bargaining agreements).
224. See, e.g., TVG, § 4(3); C. TRAv., art. L 135-2; Codice civile [C.c.] art. 2077 (It.).
225. See TVG, § 4(3); C. TRAv., art. L 135-2; C.c. art. 2077.
226. Julia Lohr & Henrike Rolbach, Vorzeitige Tariferhohungen. Bescherung am
Jahresanfang, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Feb. 11, 2011), http://fazjob.net/?
ratgeber undservice/beruf und_chance/beruf-undchance/?emcnt=118710 (Ger.)
(citing estimates according to which only five to twenty percent of employees are paid in
excess of the wages specified in collective bargaining agreements).
227. See id. (noting that it is standard practice for managerial employees to be paid
wages in excess of those specified in collective bargaining agreements).
228. See Herbert H. Joka, FOHRUNGSKRAFTE-HANDBUCH: PERSONLICHKEIT, KARRIERE,
MANAGEMENT, RECHT 540 (2002) (Ger.) (noting that collective bargaining agreements
often exclude managerial employees or at least subject them to different rules).
229. See Michael Eckert, Eingruppierung sog. AT-Angestellter [Categorization of So-
called Employees Outside Collective Bargaining Agreements], 34 DEUTSCHES STEUERRECHT
[DSTR] 1215, 1215 (1996) (Ger.) (noting that managerial employees are practically
always outside the scope of collective bargaining agreements since their responsibilities
far exceed those defined for the most senior wage level specified in the collective bargain-
ing agreement).
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expected to make a particular effort to bargain to improve the wages of
managerial employees. 230
In sum, collective bargaining agreements are very good at protecting
working-class employees against wage discrimination, but are much less
suited to protecting upper-level workers.
2. Cause Requirements
Another important mechanism that protects European employees
against discrimination lies in the rules governing the termination of
employment relationships. In France 231 and Germany, 232 as in most other
European countries,233 the general rule is that employees cannot be dis-
missed without cause. In the following section, I will first explain why the
cause requirement has the potential to offer protection against gender dis-
crimination in the hiring and in the termination context. In a second step,
I will demonstrate that this protection-in keeping with the social-demo-
cratic structure of the European fight against gender discrimination-is
much more likely to protect average employees than upper-level employees.
a. Hiring
How does the cause requirement help to reduce discrimination against
women? The classical argument by Cynthia Estlund is that such a require-
ment reduces discrimination in hiring by reducing the relative costs of hir-
230. See TiziANo TREU, LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN ITALY 38 (2d. ed.
2007) ("In recent years dissatisfaction among cadres has been growing with respect to
bargaining and wage policies adopted by major confederations, where they are
underrepresented.").
231. C. TRAV., art. L 1231-1 (Fr.). Under French law, once the trial period (periode
d'essai) expires, an employment contract without fixed duration can be terminated only
for listed permissible reasons. Id. art. L 1231-1. These reasons can be of a personal or
economic nature, but in either case, just cause (cause rtelle et serieuse) is required. Id.
arts. L 1232-1, L 1233-2.
232. See Kuindigungsschutzgesetz [KSchG] [Protection Against Termination Act],
Aug. 25, 1969, BGBL I at 1317, last amended by Gesetz [G], March 26, 2008, BGBL I at
444, § 1 (Ger.) (declaring invalid a termination that is socially unjustified and defining
as socially unjustified any termination that is not warranted by the employee's behavior
or person or compelling business reasons).
233. See Carol D. Rasnic, Balancing Respective Rights in the Employment Contract: Con-
trasting the U.S. "Employment-at-Will" Rule with the Worker Statutory Protections Against
Dismissal in European Community Countries, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 441, 478-93 (1995)
[hereinafter Rasnic, Balancing Respective Rights] (describing cause requirements in Aus-
tria, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom). Italy, too, generally requires a justification for the termination of
employees. See Legge 15 luglio 1966, n. 604 (It.); Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica
Italiana 6 Aug. 1966, n. 195, art. 1 (It.). One country that does not appear to require
cause for the termination of employment contracts is Greece. Rasnic, Balancing Respec-
tive Rights, supra, at 483. For a comparative analysis of various European regimes on
dismissal of employees, see Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Die Kiindigung, Licenciement,
Recesso dal Contrato, Firing, or Sacking: Comparing European and American Laws on Man-
agement Prerogatives and Discretion in Termination Decisions, 18 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 19 (2008).
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ing women or minority employees:234 Under a regime of at-will
employment, employees can generally be fired at any time. However, to the
extent that an at-will regime is combined with antidiscrimination legisla-
tion, some employees may become harder to fire than others. More specifi-
cally, employers may fear that minority employees and women will be
harder to dismiss than white males. 235 That, in turn, may make employers
reluctant to hire minority and female employees in the first place. 236 The
for-cause rule promises to mitigate this problem: By providing that employ-
ees can only be fired for cause, the law ensures that men and non-minority
candidates are also hard to fire, thereby establishing that it is no longer
advantageous for the employer to discriminate in favor of white males. 237
Admittedly, this traditional line of reasoning has met resistance. In a
recent article on race discrimination in France, Julie Suk argues that the
French tradition of for-cause employment may actually have increased-
rather than decreased-the problem of race discrimination. 238 Part of her
reasoning is germane to race discrimination and can therefore be disre-
garded here.239 However, she also offers one argument that seems broadly
applicable to different types of discrimination. Specifically, she argues that
the cause-requirement makes employers more anxious to avoid bad hiring
choices and therefore makes them more likely to rely (consciously or sub-
consciously) on race as a proxy for qualification. 240 In essence, the argu-
ment is that employers will be less willing to "experiment" by hiring
applicants of the disfavored ethnicity if it then becomes harder to get rid of
them.
Should Professor Suk's reasoning lead us to question the value of the
cause requirement in combating gender discrimination? It should not.
This is because even in Europe, the for-cause rules typically do not apply
immediately. For example, under German law, the legal default provides
for a trial period of six months in which the employee can be fired without
cause.241 In France, the legal default does not provide for a trial period,
but employers are at liberty to write a trial period into the employment
contract which, depending on the type of employee, can be between two
234. CYNmIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 156 (2003).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REv. 73, 75 (2007).
239. Specifically, Professor Suk argues that the cause requirement makes French
employers less likely to create jobs, and that this reluctance comes at the expense of
young people of North African descent, who, in her words, are "less qualified for
employment than others." Id. at 97. Even assuming, for the sake of the argument, that
certain minorities in France, are less well educated than the work force at large, this
argument has no bearing in the context of gender discrimination since European women
do not lag behind men in terms of education. For example, in Germany, women consti-
tute roughly half of all first year college students at 47.9%. STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT,
BILDUNG UND KULTUR: WINTERSEMESTER 2008/2009, at 11 (2009) (Ger.).
240. Suk, supra note 238, at 99.
241. KSchG § 1(1) (Ger.).
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and four months long.24 2 As a result, employers have ample time to correct
any actual or perceived "hiring mistakes" that they may have made. Of
course, employers may be reluctant to fire new employees-and thereby
correct their "hiring mistakes"-for other reasons-because they will have
to incur the costs of finding a new employee or because terminations are
bad for morale-but these reasons apply just as strongly in an employment-
at-will regime.
In sum, it seems difficult to argue, even on a merely theoretical level,
that the cause requirement makes employers more reluctant to hire women.
Quite on the contrary, the more persuasive argument is the traditional one,
namely that cause requirements reduce the likelihood of discrimination in
hiring.
b. Dismissals
While the existing literature on discrimination focuses solely on the
role of cause requirements in hiring, these requirements play, in fact, an
even more important role in preventing discrimination in the context of
dismissals. Indeed, as a practical matter, the for-cause rule helps to reduce
the risk of discriminatory dismissals in two ways.
The first is quite trivial. As one would expect, the cause requirement
makes it harder to terminate employees.2 4 3 And if it becomes harder to
terminate employees in general, then it also becomes harder to terminate
an employee for discriminatory reasons. At first glance, this solution to the
problem of discriminatory terminations may seem highly unsatisfactory.
After all, reducing the frequency of terminations does not, per se, reduce
the likelihood that the terminations that do occur discriminate on the basis
of gender. Yet such a line of reasoning misses the point. The traditional-
and understandable-concern of women's rights activists has been that
women are always first in line for termination.2 4 4  If, however, the
employer's right to dismiss employees without cause tends to be exercised
more frequently at the expense of women, then the elimination of that
right is a logical step towards more gender equality.
242. C. TRAv. art. L 1221-19 (Fr.) (specifying the upper limits for the probationary
period, which are four months long for upper-level employees, three months long for
midlevel employees, and two months long for lower-level employees).
243. See, e.g., MICHAEL BLATZ ET AL., CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING: FINANCE IN TIMES OF
CRISIS 98 (2006) (noting that the German rules against dismissal make it difficult to
terminate staff).
244. When the German Constitution was drafted, for example, one of the social-dem-
ocratic representatives justified his insistence on provisions securing equal rights for
women in employment as follows: "I am insisting with respect to [rights for] women
because the administration, whenever it finds itself in a so-called economic crisis, always
puts women second. When layoffs occur, it is the women who are laid off." PIKART &
WERNER, supra note 170 (translation by author). Cf. CLAIRE DUCHEN, WOMEN'S RIGHTS
AND WOMEN'S LIvES IN FRANCE: 1944-1968, at 141 (1994) (noting, with respect to France
in the early sixties, that "women were . . . first to be fired"); Nancy Gabin, "They Have
Placed a Penalty on Womanhood": The Protest Actions of Women Auto Workers in Detroit-
Area UAW Locals, 1945-1947, 8 FEMINIST STUD. 373, 375-98 (1982) (detailing discrimi-
natory termination practices in the American auto industry during the post-war era and
the struggle to put an end to this discrimination).
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There is, moreover, a second way in which a for-cause rule protects
women against discriminatory termination. As explained above, one of the
central challenges in European antidiscrimination law stems from the fact
that the high threshold for establishing a prima facie case makes discrimi-
nation exceedingly hard to prove.2 4 5 In this context, too, the for-cause rule
proves helpful because it substantially alleviates the information problem
faced by the employee. She no longer has to prove that the employer dis-
criminated against her. Rather, the employer has to prove that he had a
legitimate reason to terminate the employee.246 Thus, the for-cause rule
under French and German law fulfills a function which, under U.S. law, is
incumbent on the rules pertaining to the burden of proof: It forces the
employer to articulate a reason for the termination-a reason which can
then be subjected to judicial scrutiny.
c. Employees with Managerial Careers
The cause requirement is thus a crucial element of Europe's fight
against gender discrimination in the workplace. But do cause require-
ments protect all employees alike, or do they favor working-class employees
over upper-level employees? Unsurprisingly, the latter turns out to be the
case.
When an employee actually reaches the top of the corporate hierarchy
and becomes a board member, the law's preference for working-class
employees over upper-level employees becomes most obvious. In this case,
the cause requirements may not apply at all. Thus, the German rule
against dismissal without cause explicitly exempts board members.24 7 The
same result is reached by French law, since, under French law, board mem-
bers are not considered employees.248
Moreover, even to the extent that managerial employees are not board
members, the protection afforded by the for-cause rule often proves quite
limited. German law is a case in point. German courts are more likely to
find cause for termination where employees in managerial positions are
concerned. 249  Additionally, the employer can terminate managerial
employees without cause as long as he makes a severance payment.250
245. See supra Part I.B.3-4.
246. Michael Kittner & Thomas C. Kohler, Conditioning Expectations: The Protection
of the Employment Bond in German and American Law, 21 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 263,
314 (2000) (discussing German law).
247. KSchG § 14(1) (Ger.).
248. E.g., JEAN BAETEN & CLAUDE DEVOET, LA NOUVELLE LOI SUR LES PENSIONS COMPLE-
MENTAIRES 126 (2003).
249. See Bundesarbeitsgericht [BAG] [Federal Labor Court] Nov. 11, 1962, DER
BETRIEB [DB] 1055, 1055 (Ger.) (stressing that a breach of duty that might not otherwise
be sufficient to justify the immediate termination of the employee may constitute suffi-
cient cause for dismissal if the employee occupies a position of particular trust and
importance).
250. KSchG § 14(2) (Ger.). While the employer may also petition the labor court to
dissolve an employment contract with a regular employee in the absence of cause, the
labor court will only grant that request if the employer can demonstrate that he cannot
reasonably be expected to let the employment continue. Id. § 9.
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Similar rules can be found in other EU member states.25'
3. The Works Council
In the case of Germany, there is yet another mechanism that helps to
prevent wage discrimination with respect to the ordinary worker-the so-
called works council. Under German law, every firm with at least five reg-
ular employees has to allow its workers to elect, from their midst, a number
of special representatives who form the works council. 252
The works council enjoys manifold rights in employment matters vis-
A-vis the employer.253 For example, the employer generally needs the con-
sent of the works council to determine when shifts begin and end and to
change the methods of calculating wages.254
Crucially, one of the responsibilities of the works council is to protect
employees against gender discrimination. 25 5 As a general matter, the
works council is quite well-positioned to perform that task. To begin, the
council is likely to be somewhat responsive to the concerns of female
employees. 256 This is because the law takes special care to ensure that the
composition of the works council is well-balanced in terms of gender: in
those firms where female employees constitute a minority, their representa-
tion on the works council has to be at least proportional to the percentage
of women among the firm's employees.257 For example, if twenty percent
of the firm's employees are women, then at least twenty percent of the seats
on the works council must also be held by women. The same rule protects
male employees in firms where men constitute a minority of the work
force.258
Moreover, if the works council can demonstrate that the employer dis-
criminates on the basis of gender, it has the ability to force the employer to
change his ways. Apart from its general clout, the works council also has
251. For example, the Italian rules protecting employees against dismissals are not
fully applicable to managerial employees. Unlike regular employees, managerial employ-
ees "are never entitled to reinstatement, unless they are dismissed for discriminatory
reasons." ABA, 1 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS § 5.22 (William L. Keller & Timothy J.
Darby eds., 2d ed. 2003). Moreover, "when assessing the ground on which a dirigente's
dismissal is based, Italian labor courts apply criteria which are more flexible than the
strict statutory principles used in connection with the dismissal of lower employ-
ees . . . ." Id.
252. Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVGl [Works Council Act], Sept. 25, 2001, BGBI I
at 2518, last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 8, 2008, BGBI I at 1666, § 1(1) (Ger.).
253. Id. § 87 (listing the various matters in which the employer needs the consent of
the works council to make a decision).
254. Id. § 87(1).
255. Id. § 75(1).
256. This has not always been the case. Before the law ensured proportionate repre-
sentation, works councils were often criticized as being uninterested in promoting the
interests of female workers. See, e.g., MICHAELA KUHNHENNE, FRAUENLEITBILDER UND
BILDUNG IN DER WESTDEUTSCHEN NACHKRIEGSZEIT: ANALYSE Am BEISPIEL DER REGION BREMEN
253 (2005) (Ger.) (discussing the unresponsiveness of works councils to the concerns of
women in the postwar era).
257. BetrVG § 15(2) (Ger.).
258. Id.
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standing to request the labor court to enjoin the employer from a discrimi-
natory practice.259
Enforcement through the works council circumvents the major obsta-
cles to individual enforcement of European gender discrimination law. As
noted above, the problem with the general prohibitions on gender discrimi-
nation is essentially two-fold: First, the employer has little incentive to
abstain from discrimination because few employees are willing to sue and
there is no threat of punitive damages or class actions.260 Second, the rela-
tively high threshold for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination,
coupled with the unavailability of pretrial discovery, makes it hard for the
employee to prove her case. 261 However, the existence of the works council
mitigates both of these problems.
The concerns that deter a worker from antagonizing the employer do
not normally apply to the works council. Works council members enjoy
various legal protections above and beyond those afforded to regular
employees. 262 In particular, a member of the works council cannot be
fired even with cause unless the cause amounts to an "important rea-
son."263 Accordingly, the members of the works council have less to lose
from confronting the employer. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that
because of their numerous participation rights, 264 the works council mem-
bers can hardly avoid confrontations with the employer in any case. This,
too, means that the members of the works council have less to lose than
ordinary employees from standing up to the employer on the issue of
women's rights. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, membership in
the works council involves a measure of self-selection: Employees who are
concerned about antagonizing their employer are unlikely to run for works
council membership in the first place. In sum, then, the general concern
that discrimination victims are unlikely to enforce their rights for fear of
retaliation is far less pronounced with respect to the works council.
The other crucial weakness of European antidiscrimination law-the
difficulty of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination without dis-
covery-is also alleviated by the works council approach. The works coun-
cil enjoys extensive access to the company's proprietary information,
including payrolls.265 This is particularly helpful in a wage discrimination
259. See id. § 23(3) (authorizing the works council to ask the labor court for an
injunction when the employer commits material violations of duties under the Works
Council Act).
260. See supra Part I.B.1-2.
261. See supra Part I.B.3-4.
262. German law makes it a criminal offense for the employer to retaliate against
members of the works council. BetrVG § 119(1) (Ger.). Moreover, if a member of the
works council is a trainee rather than a regular employee and, therefore, is not protected
by the general prohibition against terminations without cause, the trainee-as a result of
membership in the works council-has the right to be hired as a regular employee at the
end of her training period. BetrVG § 78(a) (Ger.).
263. KSchG § 15(1) (Ger.).
264. See BetrVG § 87 (Ger.) (listing various matters in which the employer needs the
works council's consent to make a decision).
265. Id. § 80(1).
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case, where the disparate impact doctrine applies in the European
Union.266 Given that the works council does have access to the relevant
information, it is extremely well-positioned to raise disparate impact
claims.
To be sure, the German works council system described above is not
entirely representative of European labor law on a more general level. To
the extent that works councils exist in other European countries, they are
often less powerful than in Germany. 267 In France, for example, the works
council is largely limited to an advisory function.268 However, this does
not mean that the works council system plays no role in other parts of
Europe. Quite on the contrary, most other European countries have
adopted works councils in some form. 269 Indeed, for large firms with a
substantial presence in at least two member states, EU law mandates the
creation of a works council or equivalent institution.270
The protection afforded by the German works council fits seamlessly
into the social-democratic approach to gender discrimination: It offers
much more protection to working-class women than to women with mana-
gerial aspirations. The reason is quite simple. The German Works Council
Act explicitly provides that managerial employees are not considered
employees within the meaning of the Act.271 Accordingly, managerial
employees cannot participate in the election of the members of the works
council, nor can they be elected to the positions themselves. 272 The works
266. See, e.g., AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985); de
Lange, supra note 45, at 349 n.285.
267. For example, "in Britain works councils are usually regarded as instruments of
'joint consultation' . . . in sharp contrast to the German view of councils as organs of
codetermination." Wolfgang Streeck & Sigurt Vitols, The European Community: Between
Mandatory Consultation and Voluntary Information, in WORKS COUNCILS: CONSULTATION,
REPRESENTATION, AND COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 243, 276 (Joel Rogers &
Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1995) [hereinafter WORKS COUNCILS]. In Sweden, the
"absence ... of sanctions in the event of conflict limits the significance of codetermina-
tion procedures." Goran Brulin, Sweden: Joint Councils Under Strong Unionism, in WORKS
COUNCILS, supra, at 189. Other Member States are more similar to Germany in that they
have relatively powerful works councils. This is true, for example, of Spain. See, e.g.,
Modesto Escobar, Spain: Works Councils or Unions, in WORKS COUNCILS, supra, at 153,
164-65 (listing the various rights and powers enjoyed by works councils under Spanish
law). The Netherlands also fall into this category. See, e.g., Jelle Visser, The Netherlands:
From Paternalism to Representation, in WORKS COUNCILS, supra, at 80, 80-81 (describing
the rights and powers of works councils under Dutch law).
268. Jacques Rojot, France, in WORKPLACE JUSTICE: EMPLOYMENT OBLIGATIONS IN INTER-
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 136, 139 (Hoyt N. Wheeler & Jacques Rojot eds., 1992).
269. E.g., Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Histori-
cal Review and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REv 351, 447 (2002); Stephen F. Befort, A
New Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an American Works Councils Act, 69 Mo. L.
REv. 607, 636 (2004).
270. Council Directive 94/45 On the Establishment of a European Works Council,
art. 4(1), 1994 OJ. (L 254) 64.
271. BetrVG § 5(1) (Ger.).
272. This follows from a combination of various provisions of the Works Council Act.
The Act provides that managerial employees are not employees within the meaning of
the statute. Id. Only employees can vote in the elections of works council members. Id.
§ 7. Moreover, only those who can vote can be elected to the works council. Id. § 8(1).
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council therefore has little reason to be responsive to the concerns of mana-
gerial employees.273
In sum, the social-democratic model of gender discrimination law can
explain with relative ease why neither the European Union nor member
states such as France and Germany have imposed remedies and procedural
rules akin to those that protect discrimination victims in the United States:
Member states such as France and Germany can always rely on the general
rules and institutions of labor and employment law to protect working-
class employees. And while these rules and institutions fail to adequately
protect upper-level employees, the latter are not the primary target of Euro-
pean gender discrimination law in the first place.
V. The Trend Towards Quotas
One of the most significant new developments in European gender
discrimination law is the trend to diversify corporate boards though quo-
tas. 274 Does this development signal that Europe may be willing to
embrace a more class-neutral, less working-class-oriented vision of gender
discrimination law? In other words, are we witnessing an ideological shift
in European gender discrimination law?
The answer is no. The legislation at issue is symbolic in nature and
unlikely to produce more gender diversity in management. European gen-
der discrimination law is tailored to the needs of working-class women and
is not fashioned to protect women with managerial aspirations. Gender
quotas for corporate boards do not change this fact. Rather, they simply
make the symptoms less apparent.
The real choice that Europe is facing is much more profound. Europe
can retain its social-democratic structure of gender discrimination law, or
it can move towards a more class-neutral approach. And unless the regula-
tory burden imposed on European employers is substantially increased by
enacting stricter laws on gender discrimination, either choice will leave
some victims of discrimination less well protected. Quotas do not resolve
this choice, they only obscure it.
273. However, managerial employees are not left entirely without representation.
Instead of being represented by the Works Council, they are represented by the so-called
Speaker Committee (Sprecherauschuss). Sprecherausschuggesetz [SprAuG [Speaker
Comittee Act], Dec. 20, 1988, BGBL I, at S. 2312, amended by Gesetz [G], Oct. 31, 2006,
BGBL 1, at S. 2407, § 1(1) (Ger.) (providing that managerial employees in firms with at
least ten employees can elect speaker committees). However, unlike the Works Council,
the Speaker Committee has very little influence: Essentially, the Speaker Committee has
the right to be informed ahead of time of certain decisions such as the dismissal of
managerial employees. See id. H§ 30-32 (listing the rights of the speaker committee).
274. E.g., Norwegian Public Limited Liabilities Companies Act, June 13, 1997, § 6-
1la (Schjodt trans.) available at http://www.oslobors.no/obeng/Oslo-Boers/?Regula-
tions/Acts [hereinafter PLCA]; Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate
Imperative, 6 BERKLEY Bus. LJ. 55, 57 (2009).
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A. Women on Corporate Boards
Obviously, many factors influence how strongly women are repre-
sented on corporate boards. Legal protections against discrimination are a
likely issue, but so are many other dynamics-including a society's atti-
tudes towards women in leadership positions and biases against working
women more generally.
Nonetheless, it is striking that the large countries of Western Europe
all trail the United States when it comes to gender diversity in manage-
ment. To be sure, even U.S. boards are far removed from gender parity.
Among Fortune 500 companies, women account for only about 16% of
directors275 and for only 14% of corporate officers.276 Against this back-
ground, it may seem hard to believe that the United States is doing signifi-
cantly better than most of Western Europe. Yet, this is exactly what the
data on women directors in Western European countries suggests.27 7 One
recent study focusing on the 300 largest European companies278 finds that
only 7.8% of the directors on the boards of German corporations are
women.279 For the other large countries of continental Europe, the num-
bers are even lower, with France reaching an average of 7.6%, Spain an
average of 4.1%, and Italy a dismal 2.1%.280 Indeed, of the largest Western
European countries, only the United Kingdom reached double digits, with
a still modest 11.5%.281 Another recent study focusing on women direc-
tors in the Global Fortune 200 paints a similar picture.282
B. The Trend towards Quotas
In response to these numbers, Europe has recently moved towards
legally mandated gender quotas for corporate boards. The first European
275. RACHEL SOARES ET AL., 2010 CATALYST CENSUS: FORTUNE 500 WOMEN BOARD
DIRECTORS 1 (2010), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/413/2010_us-census_?
womenboarddirectors final.pdf.
276. RACHEL SOARES ET AL., 2010 CENSUS: WOMEN EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AND Top EARN.
ERS (2010), available at http://www.catalyst.org/file/412/2010_us-censuswomen_?
executiveofficers.and-topearners final.pdf.
277. See CORPORATE WOMEN DIRECTORS INTERNATIONAL, CWDI 2010 REPORT: WOMEN
BOARD DIRECTORS OF Fortune Global 200 Companies (2010) [hereinafter CWDI REPORT],
available at http://www.usjapancouncil.org/images/uploads/Women_?in-theWork
place andLeadershipIRENENATIVIDAD.pdf. According to this report, only 12.2% of
all directorships in Fortune Global 200 firms in 2009 are held by women. However, the
percentages of female corporate directors differ substantially across countries, to wit
19.5% in the United States, 10.6% in the United Kingdom, 11.9% in Germany, 11.2% in
France, and 3.6% in Italy. Id. at 8. See also EUROPEAN PROFESSIONAL WOMEN'S NETWORK,
THIRD BI-ANNUAL EUROPEAN PWN BOARD WOMEN MONITOR 2008, at 1, 7 (2008). This
study focuses on the 300 largest European firms. It finds that the percentage of female
board members is 11.5% for U.K. firms, but only 7.8% for German firms, 7.6% for
French firms, 4.1% for Spanish firms, and 2.1% for Italian firms.
278. CWDI REPORT, supra note 277, at 7.
279. Id. at 4.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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country to adopt such a quota was Norway in 2003.283 The relevant Nor-
wegian law applies to publicly traded corporations and certain state-owned
companies. Newly formed companies have had to comply with the law
since 2006; existing companies were given until 2008 to comply. 284 The
exact requirements depend on the size of a corporation's board. For exam-
ple, if the board only has three members, then it is sufficient that at least
one board member is female and at least one is male. 285 The quota rises,
however, as boards get larger. On a board with ten or more directors, each
gender has to be represented by at least 40% of the board members. 286
Originally, the Norwegian experiment did not appear to be an obvious
role model for the rest of Europe. Norway is not part of the European
Union, and, with a population of less than five million, it is among the
smaller countries of Western Europe. In addition, the Scandinavian coun-
tries, particularly Norway and Sweden, have long been viewed as much
more progressive in gender matters than the rest of Europe. 287
Nonetheless, Norway's quota law proved to be a trendsetter. In 2007,
Spain became the first EU member state to adopt a gender quota for boards
of companies that were not owned by the government.288 It should be
noted, though, that the relevant Spanish law is much weaker than the Nor-
wegian model-the Spanish version merely "recommends" that by 2015,
40% of all directors in large publicly traded corporations should be
female.289
In January 2011, the French parliament also adopted legislation
imposing gender quotas for corporate boards. Following the Norwegian
approach, this legislation requires that by 2017, 40% of all board members
in large publicly traded French corporations have to be female. 290
In June 2011, Belgium became the latest EU member state to adopt
quota legislation for corporate boards. 291 The relevant Belgian law
requires that 30 percent of board members be women, although, depend-
ing on the size of the firm, firms have several years to reach that target. 292
283. PLCA, supra note 274 § 6-11a.
284. Rosenblum, supra note 274, at 57.
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In Germany, the secretary of Labor recently announced that if Ger-
man corporations failed to ensure that at least one fourth of directors were
female by 2016, a legally mandated gender quota would follow. 2 9 3
Even the European Union appears to be warming up to quotas. In an
interview in September 2010, the EU Commissioner for Fundamental
Rights, Viviane Reding, suggested that the EU might resort to quotas to
redress the gender imbalance on corporate boards.294
C. Its Relevance
Will gender quotas for corporate boards make a difference? Based on
how the relevant quotas are designed, this seems highly unlikely. Two limi-
tations of the relevant laws stand out. First, giving women access to corpo-
rate boards is not tantamount to putting women in charge of managing
those companies; and second, quota laws are unlikely to benefit female
employees below the board level.
1. Executive Directors and Independent Directors
Giving women access to corporate boards is not the same as giving
women access to management. Corporation laws typically provide for two
types of board members: executive directors, who are part of the company's
management; and non-executive directors, who are not.
In many European countries, including the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Spain and Portugal, corporations have only one board, and accordingly,
both types of directors can be found on the same board.295 In other Euro-
pean countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands,
and the Scandinavian countries, corporations have both a managing
board-which consists of the executive directors-and a supervisory board
that contains the non-executive directors entrusted with monitoring the
managing board.296 In France and Belgium, the law allows corporations to
choose between the one-tier and the two-tier structures. 297 All of these sys-
tems have one feature in common, however: There are some directors who
manage the corporation and others who do not.
Crucially, the gender quotas that have been enacted so far do not force
corporations to raise the percentage of women among managing directors.
The relevant provision in Norway only targets the supervisory board
whose members, by definition, are not entrusted with managing the corpo-
ration.298 Spanish law does not make quotas mandatory in the first place,
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but only recommends that 40 percent of directors be women. 299 In addi-
tion, Spanish law, which provides for a one-tier boards structure, does not
require that the female directors have to be executive directors as opposed
to independent directors.300
The quota rules adopted by the lower house of the French parliament
follow a similar pattern. France, as explained above, lets corporations
choose between the one-tier structure and the two-tier structure.3 0 ' But to
the extent that corporations follow the two-tier model, the French quota
law only focuses on the supervisory boards, the so-called conseil de surveil-
lance.3 02 And to the extent that French corporations have adopted a one-
tier board structure, the relevant legislation does not mandate that any of
the female directors have to be part of the corporation's management. 303
The most recent quota law-the one adopted by Belgium in June
2011-also follows this general pattern. Corporations in Belgium usually
have a one-tier structure.304 In that case, the corporation is headed by the
conseil d'administration.305 The new Belgian law provides that 30 percent
of the members of the conseil d'administration have to be women, but does
not require that any of them be managing as opposed to non-managing
directors. 306 As previously mentioned, Belgian corporations can also opt
for a two-tier structure. In this case, the management of the corporation is
entrusted to the comite de direction,30 7 in which case the conseil
d'administration is entrusted with supervising the comite de direction.3 0s
However, nothing in the new Belgian quota law prescribes that the mem-
bers of the comite de direction have to be women.309
2. The Tip of the Iceberg
Quota laws also have a second, even more important limitation. They
merely address the tip of the iceberg. Only a small handful of employees
can ever expect to reach the corporate board. Accordingly, increasing
board diversity may benefit those select few individuals who are lucky
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enough to become a board member, but it does not help the remaining
employees. One might theorize a trickle-down effect as a corporation's
management becomes more diverse. After all, a diverse management might
be more inclined to appoint women to lower level management positions,
and this effect might slowly ripple through the company. There is some,
albeit very limited, empirical evidence tending to show that such trickle-
down effects may occur. One recent study has found that publicly traded
firms with female CEOs tend to have a smaller wage gap between men and
women in top executive jobs: Women managers in firms led by women
earned 10-20% more than women managers in comparable firms led by
male CEOs. 310 However, as pointed out above, the European quotas do not
even target executive directors, let alone female CEOs. Accordingly, there is
no reason to believe that the new quotas will benefit female employees
below the board level.
D. Consequences
In sum, the new trend towards quotas is unlikely to bring meaningful
changes. The implications, then, are obvious. For gender discrimination
theory, it is crucial that quotas do not change the fact that European gen-
der discrimination law tends to be geared towards working-class women
rather than women with managerial aspirations. Instead, they only make
the lack of diversity in management less visible. In other words, the new
quotas do not present a departure from the social-democratic model of
gender discrimination law; they merely cover up its shortcomings. Thus,
they allow European countries to pay lip service to the idea of protecting
women in managerial positions while in fact retaining the focus on non-
managerial employees.
The policy implications are equally plain. Those European countries
that want a more class-neutral gender discrimination law cannot rely on
board quotas to do the job. Instead, they will have to think about much
deeper structural reforms. The obvious possibilities include stronger reme-
dies as well as rules that make it easier for plaintiffs to prove
discrimination.
Summary and Conclusion
The United States and the European Union are both firmly committed
to eradicating gender discrimination in employment, but their strategies
differ widely. The European Union offers plaintiffs much more compre-
hensive prohibitions against discrimination. The United States, on the
other hand, boasts more powerful remedies and procedural tools.
Contrary to the existing literature, I have argued that these differences
can best be understood as expressions of a fundamental ideological divide.
Much of Europe subscribes to what I have called a social-democratic vision
310. Linda A. Bell, Women-Led Firms and the Gender Gap in Executive Compensation 1
(Haverford Coll. Dep't Econ. Inst. Study Labor, Discussion Paper No. 16892005), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=773964.
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of gender discrimination law. Rather than seeking to protect all employees
alike, the law is tailored to the needs of working-class employees and places
little emphasis on the protection of upper-level employees. By contrast,
Title VII, the heart of gender discrimination law in the United States, was
explicitly designed to protect employees across the corporate hierarchy.
Recently, Europe has been moving toward a mandatory gender quota
system for corporate boards. Following an example set by Norway, the
French Parliament has adopted legislation requiring that by 2015, at least
40% of the directors of large publicly-traded firms must be women.3 11 A
similar law has been enacted in Belgium.312 Other member states are
expected to follow, and the European Commission is even considering leg-
islation that would introduce EU-wide gender quotas for corporate
boards.313
However, the relevant laws are mostly symbolic. In particular, compa-
nies can comply with the newly imposed quotas by choosing women as
non-managing directors, thereby creating the impression of diversity with-
out actually giving women access to corporate management. Thus, gender
quotas for corporate boards do not change the fact that European gender
discrimination law is geared toward working-class women rather than
women with managerial aspirations. Accordingly, those in Europe who
want upper-level employees to enjoy a level of protection against gender
discrimination akin to that accorded to working class employees will have
to seek much more profound structural changes.
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